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                                                             Summary   
 
In this project I examine the value of artistic intentions in the interpretation of painting. 
Broadly, my main question is: Are artist’s intentions valuable in the interpretation of 
painting and to what degree do they determine a painting’s meaning? To approach this 
question, I analyse the notion of intention based on G. E. M. Anscombe’s view and 
juxtapose the execution and interpretation of everyday actions with the execution and 
interpretation of actions in art making. In the development of the notion of intention I 
propose that artists are surrounded by other states too - usually conceived by commentators 
to be equal to intention - which are essential to consider.  
 
A second issue concerns the appearance of intentions in painting and to what degree the 
viewer can grasp them based on appearance. This is discussed along with actual 
intentionalism as this assumes that intentions are apparent in painting. I will dispute this 
assumption by claiming that art making is not a mere transferring of intentions on a two-
dimensional surface and thus interpreting painting does not (only) involve recognition of 
intentions. This is also explored with a discussion about the artist’s success and the value 
of painting. Further, I investigate what we mean by ‘interpreting painting’. I make the 
distinction between ‘knowing’ and ‘understanding’ an artist’s intentions and suggest that 
interpretation of painting does not always include understanding of artistic intentions but 
involves a special kind of understanding.  
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Introduction  
 
Confronted with a painting the viewer tends to desire to interpret what she looks at. 
Interpretation can be a multifarious process and its examination raises crucial questions 
and issues. On the one hand, the intentionalist theory claims that the viewer needs to be 
aware of the artist’s intentions in order to reach a correct interpretation of a work of art and 
that in the work the artists’ intentions are available for the viewer to find. On the other 
hand, anti-intentionalists claim that the work of art is public and autonomous and therefore 
independent of the artist’s intentions. In this case, the viewer need not look for intentions, 
but needs to get familiar with the context and conventions of the work’s creation.  
 
In this project, my strategy is to show that the intentionalist position does not provide an 
adequate account of art interpretation. I begin by examining certain questions pertaining to 
the interpretation of painting and suggest an account that encompasses both a meaningful 
and emotional understanding. I then examine intentionalist theories -moderate, extreme 
and hypothetical intentionalism - as well as anti-intentionalism, and identify some 
difficulties in fully accepting them. I will not address the weaknesses of hypothetical 
intentionalism and anti-intentionalism except in passing; the reason I will present them is 
just to say that there are different kinds of intentionalism. This research is confined to the 
examination of the interpretation of only one genre of art, namely painting, but sometimes 
other genres, especially poetry, will be used as supportive examples (there is not as much 
literature on painting as on poetry). To clarify certain issues there is a detailed account of 
what an artist may do when she paints and what a viewer may do when she interprets. This 
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will eventually support the discussion of how valuable artist’s intentions are in the process 
of the viewer’s interpretation of painting.  
 
To pursue this strategy, I hold the view that the interpretation of painting concerns the 
understanding and aesthetic sensing of painting as well as creativity on the part of the 
viewer. My main assumption is that intentionalism is based on system theory and that this 
tactic can be undiversified. Also, intentionalism is a theory of meaning and as such it 
excludes other inherent properties of the work which are part of aesthetic experience. I 
propose to espouse a pluralistic and multi-dimensional approach which is not only based 
on systematic meaning, but also on emotion, creativity and spontaneity. That is to say, an 
amalgamation of meaning encompassing the aesthetic and the ingenious involvement of 
the viewer will provide a richer and more rewarding interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Issues pertaining to interpretation  
In an attempt to present an account of what interpretation might be, one faces two crucial 
questions: (i) how do we interpret a painting (using what is meaningful) and (ii) what are 
the effects of interpreting a painting on the viewer. In approaching a response to the first 
question one can suggest that in order to interpret a painting the viewer uses perceptual 
abilities like seeing and that one engages in activities like reading titles, catalogues, 
critiques, having talks with curators, listening to the artist’s talks or interviews, looking at 
the artist’s diaries and reading about the artist’s background. As regards the second 
question, in the practice of interpreting the viewer undergoes some mental and physical 
processes like imagining, understanding, enjoying or disliking, remembering, feeling 
beauty, awe or fear and so on. Also, she may be asking herself questions like what are the 
properties of this painting, what did the artist intend, is the painting beautiful? At that 
moment, three further questions also arise: what (i) aspects of painting and (ii) further 
information about it should be taken into account and (iii) to what extent do the artist’s 
intentions determine the interpretation of painting. The aspects of painting comprise of its 
shape, form, colours, technique, artistic skills, media, content and subject. Information 
about it can be the title, criticism, the artist’s intentions and catalogues. In addressing the 
third question there is a dominant theory involved: actual intentionalism. This constitutes 
the main focus of this work and will be further examined below.           
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Before presenting actual intentionalism, we will first examine the question of how do we 
interpret painting and provide a preliminary approach towards the question of what is it to 
interpret a painting, which will be eventually further developed throughout this work. 
 
1. How do we interpret a painting? 
Beyond the ability to see and perceive, the viewer uses other means too: engaging in 
activities like reading titles, critiques, books, the artist’s biography, having talks with 
curators, listening to artist’s talks or interviews, looking at the artist’s diaries and 
catalogues. All of these provide the viewer with knowledge about a painting, its context 
and the artist’s life or work in general. Cognitive abilities like imagination and creativity 
are also brought into play. In the process of seeing, the recognition of formal aspects like 
colours, forms and shapes – and therefore of the pictorial space – takes place. Imagination 
is employed as it endorses combinations of input in various ways, flexibility of thought, 
disengagement from reality, thinking about situations and experiences and their connection 
to the painting. In addition to that, creativity is an important aspect of interpretation 
because it enables the viewer to develop ideas, originality, divergent thinking, new 
approaches and spontaneous responses. These abilities and activities can be the primary 
tools that the viewer uses in order to interpret painting
1
.    
               
2. What is it to interpret a painting?  
The word ‘interpret’ means to translate and it is close to the term ‘hermeneutics’. This does 
not entail reducing interpretation to mere translation but rather implies a ‘rendering’. I 
                                                          
1
 This is discussed with examples in chapter 6, sections 2 and 3. 
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suggest that interpretation is the possibility of discovering and experiencing something 
through the presence of the work; interpretation is a process where the viewer renders her 
relation with the painting in understanding and/or in aesthetic sensing. Let us call this act 
an act of synaesthesis. In this context, synaesthesis joins understanding and aesthetic 
sensing and can be a special kind of awareness and sensitivity which the painting evokes in 
the viewer; it makes the viewer alert to understanding and feeling. This proposes that a 
painting can be both meaningful and sensual. The canvas itself cannot be meaningful and 
sensual but the relation of the viewer with the painting can induce meaningfulness and 
sensuality. Meaningfulness can take place through understanding, and sensuality through 
aesthetic sensing.  
 
By understanding I mean that the viewer conceptualizes what the painting reveals to her. 
The painting relates the viewer to reality because it shows her something about it, it alerts 
her and calls for her awareness about it through revelation. Understanding might be 
achieved by means of the drives of intelligence, imagination and creativity, as well as 
through knowledge. Intelligence, imagination and creativity may depend on the individual 
abilities of the viewer and the information she knows about the painting. As mentioned 
above, in interpreting painting, knowledge may come from reading titles, catalogues, 
critiques, having talks with curators, listening to artist’s talks or interviews, looking at the 
artist’s diaries, reading about the artist’s background or finding out about the artist’s 
intentions. Therefore, this kind of knowledge can sometimes assist interpretation. In later 
sections we explore in detail instances where this kind of knowledge assists interpretation 
and examples when it does not.  
12 
 
 
Aesthetic sensing can cause feelings, sensations, emotions and stimulate mood in certain 
ways. For instance, it can cause feelings of pleasure, irritation, awe, passivity, the sense of 
beauty or ugliness.
2
 Aesthetic sensing is linked to sensuality which promotes an 
exploration of the painting through the senses. It is difficult to separate understanding from 
aesthetic sensing as sometimes one may help the other and they may happen at the same 
time. In effect, both of them constitute interpretation, sometimes individually and 
sometimes when combined. We will see how this can take place later.   
 
3. What aspects of the work and information about it should be taken into 
consideration? 
Noticing the formal and visual aspects of a painting constitute a necessary condition of 
interpretation. These aspects involve colour, composition, space, textures, pattern, mark, 
line, shape, form, value and space. They also include representational properties like for 
instance the property of representing a girl with an umbrella. Other aspects like size, 
materials, media, methods, techniques and their relations should also be taken into 
consideration. Reading titles, catalogues, critiques, having talks with curators, considering 
                                                          
2
 There is a long tradition of associating aesthetic experience with pleasure. A thorough investigation was 
undertaken by Kant in his Critique of Judgment where he claims that judgments of taste are based on 
responses of pleasure: for example, we think of beauty as pleasurable. The particularly close connection 
between judgments of beauty and the faculty of judgment is echoed in Kant’s assertion that the feeling of 
pleasure in a beautiful object is felt in virtue of an exercise of judgment, namely reflecting judgment (1952 
pp. 29-36). Reflecting judgment includes particulars under concepts which are already given.  Judgment is 
not an independent faculty, it is governed by the principles of understanding and it is responsible for aesthetic 
judgments (p. 18). Aesthetic judgment for Kant is a judgment which is grounded on feeling, especially on the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure (pp. 41-42). There are three kinds of aesthetic judgment: judgments of the 
agreeable, judgments of the beauty and judgments of the sublime. In addition to this, Kant contends that 
beauty is not a property of an artwork or natural phenomenon; it is rather a consciousness of pleasure which 
attends the ‘free play’ of imagination and understanding (‘free play’ manifests ‘free lawfulness’); it might 
appear that we use reason to decide what is beautiful but the judgment is aesthetic, not logical (pp. 41-42). 
Lastly, a pure judgment of taste is subjective since it refers to the emotional response of the subject and it is 
based on appreciation of an object: it is a ‘disinterested’ pleasure because it is independent of the desire of 
the subject for the object (pp. 82-85).  
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the dates relevant to the work, the name of the artist, the country where the work was 
made, listening to artist’s talks or interviews, looking at the artist’s diaries, reading about 
the artist’s background and biography, her artist’s statement and stated intentions; all these 
are sources of potentially helpful information but they are not determinative and do not 
constitute a necessary condition for interpretation. I will argue that formal and visual 
aspects constitute the content of the painting, which is determined by the artist, and should 
be given significant consideration in interpretation. However, they should be considered in 
relation to the viewer, not the artist.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Theories of Intentionalism  
Below I give an overview of four versions of intentionalism: (i) moderate actual 
intentionalism, extreme actual intentionalism, (iii) hypothetical intentionalism and (iv) 
anti-intentionalism. To clarify the terminology in play here, the term ‘viewer’ is used in the 
text with reference to painting, whereas the term ‘reader’ is used to discuss literary fiction. 
The term ‘interpreter’ encompasses both viewer and reader. Also, for abbreviation reasons 
moderate actual intentionalism will be sometimes referred to as MAI, extreme actual 
intentionalism as EAI and work as painting.     
 
Moderate Actual Intentionalism 
Moderate actual intentionalism holds that in order for the viewer to understand the 
meaning of a work she has to have knowledge of at least some of the actual artist’s 
intentions.3 Interpretation takes place within the framework of the artist’s intentions and 
therefore in order for the viewer to interpret a work she can use the artist’s diaries, letters, 
notes, biographical information and personal statements as elements that help her identify 
artistic intentions and eventually reach the appropriate interpretation of a work (Livingston 
1998, p. 835). Specifically, according to Livingston:  
“Moderate intentionalism is the thesis that the actual maker(s)’ attitudes and 
doings are responsible for some of the a work’s content, and as such are a 
legitimate target of interpretive claims; more specifically, knowledge of 
some, but not all intentions is necessary to some, but not all valuable 
interpretive insights because such intentions are sometimes constitutive of the 
work’s features or content” (p. 835).    
 
                                                          
3
 Some of the key moderate intentionalists are Livingston, Mele, Iseminger, Carroll, Currie and Walton . 
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MAI further claims that the artist’s intentions do not always establish the work’s meaning 
but at the same time maintains that in the cases where intentions are compatible with the 
work then they can be constitutive of a work’s implicit meanings; artists sometimes boost 
the value of their work by expressing attitudes implicitly and indirectly (p. 835). The 
notion of implicit meanings is enunciated in the context of Gricean ideas of conversational 
implicature which will be discussed in detail along with Carroll’s position of art as 
conversation in chapter 6.  
 
Moreover, the meanings intended by the artist are the most appropriate interpretations of a 
work and, as a result, interpretations can sometimes either be appropriate or non-
appropriate. I would define appropriate interpretation in EAI and MAI as an interpretation 
which is proper and embraces some kind of objectivity which as a result makes it 
acceptable within a certain system of premises – namely EAI and MAI. For instance, it is 
acceptable to say that in Gericault’s The Raft of the Medusa4 that the artist intended to 
represent raft called Medusa and its survivors. This is an appropriate interpretation. Non-
appropriate interpretation entails an understanding which is not suitable to artistic 
intentions: for example, if a viewer  thinks that the painting is about a raft from a ship of 
pilgrims. If the artist’s intentions are successfully communicated, that is, her intentions are 
apparent in the work, then they lead to the appropriate interpretation. Thus, for MAI 
meaning can be conceived as a stable commodity and the ultimate aim of interpretation is 
to find the true intended meaning(s). In addition to this, the conception that art in general is 
                                                          
4
 Table of Pictures, Figure 1. 
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essentially about communication is an important position within the MAI context, since 
MAI is principally a theory of searching the artist’s intended meaning.5 
 
Extreme Actual Intentionalism 
Extreme actual intentionalism is a much stronger and absolute version of MAI, and is also 
sometimes referred to as strong or absolute intentionalism. This version of intentionalism 
places a lot of emphasis on the logical equivalence between a work’s meaning and the 
artist’s intentions. The most important premise of EAI is concerned with the utterer’s 
meaning (artist’s meaning) and it claims that interpretation should be driven by what is 
intended by the artist even when she fails to achieve her intention. That is to say, a work 
still contains the meanings it was intended to, despite the fact that these meanings may be 
obscured or cannot be immediately identified in the work. Furthermore, it perceives the 
understanding of literary works in a similar way to the understanding of utterances in 
linguistic communication (Livingston 1998, p. 831). In this view, meaning constitutes a 
definitive part of the work and there is an objective meaning which it is the task of the 
interpreter to locate.
6
  
 
Hypothetical Intentionalism  
This view accepts that there is intention in art, but holds that the intention that shows the 
meaning of a work is not the actual artist’s intention but some other intention that the 
reader can suppose about an imagined artist. In this process, the actual intentions of an 
                                                          
5
 This will also be elaborated in chapter 6 along the discussion about Carroll.  
6
 The most prominent EA intentionalists are Hirsch, Knapp and Michaels whose specific views will be 
examined later.   
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artist need not be considered in the interpretation of the work, rather the reader has to look 
for the most likely intentions of a supposed artist. The best account of hypothetical 
intentions is the one that makes the work epistemically and aesthetically best.  
 
Levinson (2004) is the major proponent of hypothetical intentionalism. He formulates his 
account by putting forth the following four models of meaning of literary interpretation: a) 
the kind of meaning which is analogous to word-sequence meaning, b) the meaning which 
is analogous to the utterer’s meaning, c) the meaning that is analogous to the utterance 
meaning and d) ludic meaning. Word-sequence meaning is the dictionary meaning, both 
literal and connotative. The utterer’s meaning is the meaning the author intentionally has in 
mind to convey by the use of certain means. Utterance meaning is the meaning that springs 
from the means the author used in the context it is uttered, the meaning that results from 
the means used. Ludic meaning involves any meanings which are given to a ‘brute’ text or 
a text-as-utterance through a play of interpretation that is defined loosely by ‘plausibility, 
intelligibility and interest’ (p. 291).   
 
The first aspect to point out is that for Levinson, the meaning of literary texts is not equal 
to word or sentence-sequence meaning because in the process of interpretation it is 
important to have in mind that the sentences uttered come from somebody’s (an author’s) 
mind, they have a purpose and they are expressed as an act of communication by means of 
sentences. The case is that the reader does not treat a literary text in the same way one 
would treat random words or sentences found somewhere. In a literary work the sentences 
are not a simple collection of sentences but they are ‘the body and substance of what we 
18 
 
 
assume to be a unitary act of expression’ (p. 291). Through this position he asserts that the 
author’s intention is important to the work’s interpretation.  
 
For Levinson, the most important model of meaning is utterance meaning.
7
 Utterance 
meaning is determined by the context of the work’s presentation. This perhaps includes 
some characteristics of the author and some other aspects related to its place in culture. 
Therefore, utterance meaning is the hypothesis of the utterer’s meaning that the reader 
constructs, substantiated on the grounds of her beliefs and attitudes which she has as an 
intended reader. Thus, utterance and the utterer’s meaning are different. Nevertheless they 
are related conceptually. That is to say, in order to grasp the utterance meaning, according 
to Levinson, one has to aim ‘at utterer’s meaning in the most comprehensive and informed 
manner we can muster as the utterance’s intended recipients’ (p. 292). This account of 
utterance meaning does not entail that one should seek the actual intention of the author. It 
is rather a hypothesized intention which results from all the information provided from the 
text and its creative context, such as the time and place of the work’s creation, the cultural 
and social norms of that age and so on. In other words, the meaning of a literary text is not 
the meaning produced by the words and sentences received from the author’s actual 
intention, but it is the best hypothesized attribution of the author’s intention on the part of 
the reader. This is crucial for Levinson because this parameter clearly differentiates actual 
from hypothetical intentionalism (p. 292). I will not address any problems with 
hypothetical intentionalism because in my view it does not diverge to a large extent from 
actual intentionalism, as I will argue that it shares its faults.   
                                                          
7
 Utterance meaning is verbal and therefore linguistic; in the context of this project utterance refers to the 
representation of painting since painting is not committed to language and other parameters that come with it.   
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Anti-intentionalism 
The main proponents of the anti-intentionalist position are Wimsatt and Beardsley (1995) 
whose theses are asserted in the Intentional Fallacy. They propose that knowledge of the 
artist’s intentions is irrelevant to the interpretation of a work of art and that a work of art is 
public; it is publicly shared and does not aesthetically belong to anyone and therefore its 
interpretation is varied since it is ‘measured against something that is outside its author’ (p. 
379). In particular, they claim that:  “…the design or intention of the author is neither 
available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of a literary art” (p. 
375). From this perspective, interpretation of a work of art neither requires that the viewer 
identify the artist’s intentions nor that interpretation derives from or through the work 
itself. 
Semantic and Categorical Intentions  
My target in this section is not to discuss but to mention Walton’s and Levinson’s view on 
semantic and categorical intentions in order to further clarify the nature of actual 
intentionalism and its versions. Throughout this project I endorse the view that categorical 
intentions determine how a work of art is to be conceived and further claim that semantic 
intentions do not determine a work’s meaning.  
Walton’s claim is that categorical interpretation is crucial to the proper understanding of 
semantic intentions. For instance, we need to know in assessing a Byzantine icon of a saint 
whose halo has been completely faded, and thus is absent from the picture, that it is not a 
painting with a person. In Categories of Art Walton (1970) expounds a theory about how 
20 
 
 
the perception of representation works. He holds that for any category of art there are 
standard, variable and contra-standard properties. This is explained as follows.  
Works of art are things which have various properties and we are primarily interested in 
their perceptual properties like for example the visual properties of painting. Works of art 
have aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties; aesthetic properties like the sense of agony, the 
colour palette, shape, form and composition. Aesthetic properties are characteristics of 
works of art which can be seen in the work, i.e. to see a painting’s sense of agony (pp. 335-
336). In particular, he claims that:  
“A work’s aesthetic properties depend not only on its non-aesthetic ones, but 
also on which of its non-aesthetic properties are ‘standard’, which ‘variable’, 
and which ‘contra-standard’” (p. 338).  
The viewer perceives the representation of a work which is determined by one of the three 
kinds of properties of the category. The aesthetic properties a work of art seems to us to 
have depend on which of them are standard, variable and contra-standard for us. A feature 
of work is standard with reference to a category in the case it is among those in virtue of 
which ‘works in that category belong to that category’ (a lack of that feature would 
disqualify a work form that category). A feature is variable with reference to a category in 
the case it has nothing to do with works’ belonging to that category. A feature is contra-
standard with reference to that category, that is to say, absence of a standard feature or 
presence of a feature which tends to disqualify works as members of the category. Walton 
suggests that it is unclear in all cases whether a feature is standard, variable or contra-
standard with respect to a category as the criteria that classify works of art are not precise. 
Despite that, there are a lot of clear examples. For instance, the flatness of a painting and 
the motionlessness of its markings are standard, its specific forms and colours are variable 
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with respect to the category of painting and the fact that there are some three-dimensional 
things stuck on the canvas would be contra-standard to the category of painting (pp. 339-
340). He argues that what aesthetic properties a work seems to have will depend on what 
the viewer believes are the standard, variable and contra-standard features relative to a 
category. But what aesthetic properties it really does have depends on the true facts about 
category membership (genre, material, kind of art) and what is standard, variable and 
contra-standard for that category.  
Another important conception of categorical and semantic intentions is provided by Jerrold 
Levinson. Levinson (1992) distinguishes two kinds of intentions in the process of the 
production and reception of art: semantic and categorical intentions. The view of 
categorical intentions argues that a work is conceptualized and defined by the category or 
the genre to which the work belongs. This category is determined not only by the artist but 
also by the date of the work’s production. The interpreter is therefore encouraged to 
classify the work within a certain genre. Categorical intentions involve intentions of the 
artist regarding how the work is to be approached. These intentions are basic in the sense 
that the artist determines the conception of what the work is and what it is for, like for 
instance whether something is a painting or sculpture, whether a piece of text is a poem or 
a novel, whether a painting is cubist or a still life.  
 
On the other hand, semantic intentions involve the intentions of the artist to mean 
something by her work. According to Levinson, semantic intentions can fail, while 
categorical intentions rarely do so. This is because if for example an artist wants to convey 
A through her work but ends up conveying B, then she semantically failed. But it is very 
22 
 
 
difficult to fail if she wanted her work to be a poem or a novel. For Levinson, categorical 
intentions are of higher importance than semantic intentions. The semantic intentions of an 
artist who fails to convey what she intends do not determine the reception of the work, but 
on the other hand, categorical intentions such as what kind of work is the work are basic to 
how the work is to be conceived. Categorical intentions ‘orient’ the interpreter in relation 
to the work and constitute the basic level which will enable her to find meanings in the 
work. Moreover, categorical intentions are inherently part of the creation of the work and 
at the point where the artist decides that her work is finished she determines what kind her 
work is: the making and the materials of the work will determine whether the work is for 
instance a painting or a poem or a film (pp. 236-237).  
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CHAPTER 3 
The nature of intention  
I introduce this chapter here in order to help understand the notion of intention and 
particularly the notion of intention in the process of art-making as this will later help 
distinguish how the interpretation of intentions in everyday actions differ from 
interpretation of intentions in artistic actions. This chapter examines the nature of intention 
and is divided in two parts. The first part examines the notion of intention, firstly how it is 
perceived in the context of Anscombe’s Intention and the second part how this notion is to 
be perceived in relation to art making. It seems that MA and EA intentionalists maintain a 
conception of artist’s intentions that is analogous to intentions of everyday actions. I 
assume that in their accounts they do not explain the nature of intention in depth and 
specifically in the realm of the creative process and how it might be distinctive in special 
ways both when employed in action and when it is interpreted. To clarify this, I will 
discuss the question whether artists always have intentions and examine some states that 
usually surround the artist which are not to be intrinsically perceived as intentions. For this 
reason, it is important to explore the nature of intention in painting process in more depth 
as this will help understand that making a painting is not a pure transference of intentions 
and therefore interpretation is not a pure decoding of those intentions.  
I.  
Anscombe’s account: what is intention?  
My aim is to focus on certain aspects of Anscombe’s theory which are relevant to the 
discussion of intentions in art making and not to give a complete account of it. Anscombe 
(2000) claims that “Intention appears to be something that we can express” (p. 5). 
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According to her, in order to understand what it is to intend to act one has to understand 
intentional action. We act intentionally when a certain sense of the question ‘why’ is given 
application to our action and when we perform an intentional action we also act for reasons 
(p. 9). To explain that, she says:  
“What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? 
The answer that I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain 
sense of the question ‘Why’ is given application; the sense is of course that in 
which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting” (p .9).  
 
To answer ‘what is it for an agent to act intentionally’ Anscombe gives the following 
criteria: i) an act is intentional when the agent can know that he is executing that act and 
why she is executing it, ii) an act is intentional when the question ‘why is given 
application, iii) an act is intentional when the question ‘why’ can be answered in any of the 
following ways: i) an interpretation of the action and ii) a reference to something in the 
future (pp. 24-28).  
The questions that arise here are: what is it for ‘why’ to have application’ and ‘what does 
‘why’ mean?  To explain the sense of ‘why’ she suggests that we can say it is a request for 
the agent’s reasons for action; the expression of intention is justified by reason (p. 6).  That 
is to say, A acts intentionally when the question ‘what are A’s reasons for acting?’ has 
application. According to Anscombe ‘why’ has three senses: a) evidential, b) causal and c) 
reason-giving. She asserts that someone acts intentionally if the third sense has application 
(pp. 9-10). For example, when someone asks ‘why did you kill him?’ and replies ‘he killed 
my father’, this is a reason rather than a cause. Something “is a reason, as opposed to a 
cause, when the movement is voluntary and intentional” (p. 10).  
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Despite that, there are cases, according to Anscombe, where the question ‘why’ fails to 
have application: namely, when the agent is unaware that she does that action (she does not 
know she is doing something) and when the action is involuntary (like the peristaltic 
movement of the gut) as well as when the agent has non-observational knowledge that she 
is doing something, but does not have non-observational knowledge of what is the cause of 
her doing something (pp. 11-13). Anscombe claims that there is knowledge without 
observation, that is to say, an agent knows something without observation if she knows and 
there is no distinct sensory event on the basis of which she knows it. The crucial point is 
that for Anscombe, intentional action is that which the agent knows she is doing without 
having to look. She believes that intentional action and non-observational knowledge are 
necessarily connected. She says: 
“We first point out a particular class of things which are true of a man: 
namely the class of things he knows without observation. E.g. a man 
usually knows the position of his limbs without observation. It is without 
observation, because nothing shews him the position of his limbs; it is not 
as if he were going by a tingle in his knee, which is the sign that it is bent 
and not straight. Where we can speak of separately describable 
sensations, having which is in some sense our criterion for saying 
something, then we can speak of observing that thing; but that is not 
generally so when we know the position of our limbs” (p. 13).  
In summary, Anscombe’s criteria of an intentional action are: someone acts intentionally i) 
when a certain sense of the question ‘Why’ (once it is not a request for cause or evidence) 
is given application to her action, ii) when she knows that she is doing something non-
observationally and iii) when she knows what is the cause of doing something non-
observationally. 
This account of intention will be examined below in relation with what intention involves 
in the process of painting. This will eventually suggest that intentions in the context of 
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Anscombe’s account, and actual intentionalism, are expressed in different ways than 
intentions in painting and hence are to be differently interpreted.  
II.  
How intention is expressed in painting and everyday actions  
By intentions in everyday actions I mean intentions similar to the ones discussed in 
Anscombe’s context, like for example raising one’s arm, watching a film, reading a book 
and so on. In painting there are various kinds of intentions that underlie the process of 
creation as well as some other states which are frequently classified as intentions but which 
do not constitute intentions in the way they are conceived of in everyday actions. This 
develops in the following discussion.  
When an artist sets out to make a painting she might have a wide range of possible 
intentions, among others. Firstly, she can have general and specific intentions. General 
intentions are those for example where she intends to paint a landscape (categorical 
intentions), or to make a painting look dramatic, and specific intentions are those where 
she intends to use a specific colour, line or shape. Also, she can have intentions that are not 
related to the aesthetic; like for instance when she wants to sell, instruct and so on. Another 
kind of intention can be the intention not to intend anything particular with the work.
8
 
Moreover, artist’s intentions include choosing a medium, method or technique, details of 
compositional elements and the intentions to represent or convey meaning (semantic 
intentions). Sometimes an artist may succeed in her intentions with regard to the use of her 
medium but may fail in her intentions to convey the meaning she initially envisaged 
conveying, or vice versa. 
                                                          
8
 This is discussed in detail throughout sections 1, 2 and 3 of this part.  
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In addition to this, for an artist to have intentions can encompass many situations and 
states, which actual intentionalists only conceive of as intentions. Although the artist 
(sometimes) has intentions she also undergoes states that do not involve intentions or 
intentions that function in the same way as intentions in everyday actions. In the making of 
painting, intention takes place when the artist begins by having a fixed plan and follow it 
to the letter; or when she initially has a plan but later on changes her mind consciously and 
ends up doing something else. Such a plan is a kind of intention. Other states that do not 
involve intention can include the following: Seeing a good-looking or unattractive person 
can give the artist a motive to paint a portrait. Having talked to a humble person can be an 
inspiration to paint a portrait. The fact that someone is leaving can give a reason to paint a 
portrait. The feeling of enjoyment or pain can also be a reason to paint a portrait. To paint a 
portrait of an irritated person which represents her as calm and peaceful is something that 
the artist might have wished. To be curious about how it is possible to make a portrait of 
someone by the use of pigments can make a painter paint a picture, and to feel enticed to 
painting can be a desire to paint. A motive, an inspiration, a reason, a wish or a desire are 
not all equal to intention as it is perceived in Anscombe’s account and as it seems to be 
inferred by actual intentionalism.   
 
As mentioned earlier, Anscombe’s view that for an act to be intentional the agent has to 
know she is doing that action and know why she doing it, points towards an appeal for the 
agent’s reasons for action. In relation to the artist’s intentions in pain ting, we can say of an 
artist who is inspired (or desired or experimented) to do a certain painting of an humble 
person that this inspiration constituted the reason and by extension her intention to do this 
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painting. In other words, if we ask ‘why did the artist paint this painting?’ we will say that 
she painted it because she got inspired by a humble person. This explanation sounds 
plausible but it does not necessarily follow that inspiration, motives or desires are reasons 
which always lead to the intention to do a painting, as we will see later with specific 
examples. It appears that sometimes artists intend certain actions without knowing about 
those actions (like experimentation) and perform certain actions without knowing why they 
do so in specific. In the following section I will analyse some of the states that do not 
always involve intention in the same sense as those in everyday actions, like inspiration, 
desire and experimentation. 
 
The argument of this part proposes that artists do not only have intentions when they paint, 
but they also undergo other states, as will be explained below, and engage in actions which 
are not always intentional. As pointed out earlier, for an artist intending to be doing can 
involve many situations and states: a motive, a plan, an inspiration, a reason, a wish or a 
desire, can all be part of the artist’s mental states, but not all of them are equal to intention 
like they might be in everyday actions. Inspiration, desire and experimentation constitute 
states and actions which are prolific within the artist and her creative process, and do not 
always involve the application of intention in the way everyday actions do. Therefore, a 
viewer searching for artist’s intentions can sometimes imply a search for something that 
has not taken place. For example, it may be the case that some actions arise out of spur of 
the moment or out of unconscious states as we will see below, rather than out of intention. 
To illustrate the point I will discuss the following states and actions. 
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1. Inspiration  
In this section I propose that inspiration is a key stage in the artist’s creative process and it 
is not intrinsically related to expression of intention in the way assumed in MAI and EAI 
context. I distinguish artistic inspiration in three kinds: (i) instinctive inspiration, (ii) 
euphoria of production and (iii) invoked inspiration.   
(i) Instinctive Inspiration  
The first kind concerns instinctive inspiration when it comes unsought and spontaneously. 
In this instance inspiration is “the sudden genesis of an idea in consciousness without the 
interference of will” (Tegopoulos-Fitrakis 1993, p. 242). The corresponding Greek word is 
empneusi which can be rendered as something like in-breath. A breath is automatic and 
comes naturally and it constitutes one of the ways inspiration comes to artists in cases like 
that – it comes when it is unintentionally invited, just like a breath. It is closely related to 
openness, a state which is unforced and does not require reason for coming to one’s mind. 
It implicates a state of sudden stimulations which result in the act of painting, incentives 
that are unexpected and unplanned. It provokes feeling, stimulates imagination and is more 
of an impulse, an urge, rather than an intention as one does not intend this kind of 
inspiration, it comes involuntarily without consciously seeking it. 
An example of this first kind of inspiration can involve cases when the artist by seeing a 
certain state of affairs, unexpectedly paints that with no conscious thinking and without 
knowing why; or while she is having dinner all of a sudden a picture comes to her mind 
without having prior intention to think about it which she then paints. One could claim that 
it is hard to see the contrast of inspiration and intention here as on a first look it may seem 
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natural to think that an artist is first inspired to paint A which intuitively comes to her mind 
and then intends to paint A as a result of her inspiration, therefore, since inspiration is 
followed by an intentional action (painting) then it should be conceived of as intention. 
The distinction of inspiration and intention here links to the above definition given by 
Anscombe with regard to the question ‘why’. She claims that one of the criteria of an 
intentional action is for the agent to know why she is doing that action. The difficulty with 
accepting that the picture which unexpectedly comes to the artist’s mind (inspiration) is an 
intention is constituted from the fact that when the artist gets inspired she does not know 
why this has happened to her; i.e. while she goes to the post office or cleans the house 
suddenly a picture comes to her mind which she then decides to paint, she does not know 
why this picture came to her mind; she had not intended to think about that picture. To say 
that she painted the picture because it suddenly came to her mind, and therefore claim that 
it is a reason for action and as such an intention, is a superficial approach to adopt in 
interpretation because this does not establish a meaningful reason that gives information or 
explanation of her action as instances of everyday actions may do. For instance, in 
everyday actions, in the statement ‘I am studying because tomorrow I have exams’ the 
reason I am studying is because I have an exam which explains why I am doing this action. 
The reason gives justified and useful information about the question ‘why I am studying’. 
With regard to asking ‘why did the artist paint that picture?’ and answering that ‘she 
painted it because it suddenly came to her mind while she was taking a walk’ does not 
establish a justified and useful reason that gives information about the painting’s 
interpretation. To take this reason into consideration would be shallow for interpreting 
painting as it does not give explanatory information about it. Useful information, which 
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would count as reason, could be for instance the answer that the artist painted this picture 
because she wanted to represent or express concept X or to stimulate the viewer in this or 
that way. This reason gives ground to the viewer to interpret the artist’s intentions, but 
when the artist’s intentions are constituted by instinctive inspiration which she herself does 
not know why she thought of, then they might not be useful to search for. Here, one might 
point out that inspiration of this sort looks like cause than a reason. On a first look, it is a 
cause because it was unintentionally induced (like the case when a picture of something 
comes to the artist’s mind). On a second look, it is a reason because after the un-induced 
appearance of the picture the artist intentionally decided to paint it.  
Some artists have claimed that while painting they are overwhelmed by the fact that the 
picture they produce is beyond their conscious control. In particular, Kokoschka – 
speaking of images and visions that are beyond our control – states that:  
“Consciousness is a sea ringed about with visions, and what floats into this 
sea is beyond our control. Whether the image that takes shape suddenly is of 
material or an immaterial character, figurative or non-figurative, that too is 
beyond our control. It is the psyche which speaks, and all the artist can do is 
to bear witness to the vision within himself. But the vision itself is fed by 
the images from all human experience, as a lamp with oil, and the flame 
leaps before the artist’s eyes as the oil feeds it” (Read 1991 p. 244).  
 
The inspiration, or the conception, of a picture in such a process occurs automatically, that 
is to say, it does not need any stipulated reason for action which explains the intention. The 
inspired creation of painting in such cases does not require a kind of aitiotis. It is difficult 
to ask why did someone suddenly got inspired with a certain idea or why that picture came 
to her mind. In cases like this there is no clearly explicable reason why an artist created a 
painting. It is something that escapes her intentional behavior and comes at a moment 
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when it is not anticipated. In everyday actions discussed by Anscombe, the agent has to be 
aware of why she is acting in a certain way for that action to be intentional. Inasmuch this 
might be true of intentions in everyday actions, in painting, in cases of instinctive 
inspiration, it is hard for an artist to know why a picture unpredictably appeared in her 
mind and constituted an inspiration for her.   
(ii) Euphoria of production 
The second kind of inspiration is euphoria of production. In the course of this state the 
artist feels a special kind of energy to create a painting without really intending to do 
something specific; she feels a drive to perform the actual act of painting without 
consciously knowing why she feels a drive to paint; what she will eventually paint will 
come along while she paints. The difference of instinctive inspiration and inspiration as 
euphoria of production lies in the fact that the first one involves an unexpectability of why 
certain pictures come to the artist’s mind and the second one boils down to a sense of 
energy which is directly connected to action to create. Instances of the artist’s experience 
of euphoria of production include cases like when she enters her studio, picks up a canvas 
among many sizes of canvases without thinking much about picking a certain size; she 
begins mixing colours and applies them on the surface without too much conscious thought 
and then sees that she has started painting a seascape by using yellow palette paints and the 
specific technique she does. Let’s suppose that in such a case, if a critic were to ask the 
artist ‘Why did you paint this picture?’ – in a search to spot her intentions and therefore 
understand the painting – she would reply ‘I felt like painting and as a result I painted this’. 
In a different case where the artist does not paint out of such a kind of inspiration 
(consciously intends to paint a seascape) and intentionally paints a yellow-palette seascape 
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because i.e. she wants to experience and enjoy intensity, if a critic were to ask her ‘Why 
did you paint this’ she would reply ‘I was captivated by the strength of waves and wanted 
to depict this and eventually to create the aesthesis of vibrancy through yellow tones’ is a 
different kind of reply than the first one. In the second case, the critic has a ground to 
comment on the artist’s statement and construct assumptions about her intentions but in the 
first case it is difficult to explain her statement. Inspiration of this kind is rather 
indescribable because it is difficult to explain why and where it comes from; sometimes 
intentional actions in painting can be put in words and somehow be explained like in the 
first case just cited, but with regard to the second one it is hard to explain why someone 
felt a euphoria of production to paint a yellow-palette seascape. By saying that she felt like 
that she does not really articulate a meaningful sentence that hints at something concrete or 
that shows why she painted that. To say ‘I felt like painting it’ does not contribute to a 
meaningful statement. Strictly speaking such statements do not say anything. In this 
instance, the critic or the viewer can only draw hypothetical conclusions about the artist’s 
intentions because the artist’s statement does not really offer something illuminating or 
something that could be useful for the viewer’s interpretation. I think both the state of 
instinctive inspiration and euphoria of production are underrated by MAI in relation to the 
following claim. Livingston states that the moderate intentionalist:  
“Holds that the theory of appreciation and interpretation should be 
attuned to the artist’s constitutive role in the making of works. It is the 
artist who, within “natural and logical limits,” makes the work, and 
choosing the settling on categories and meanings is part of that creative 
process. We ought to reject the criticism promoting idea that it is the 
reader who invents the story; we prefer instead, a communicative model 
in which the reader attempts to discover the nature of the story as told, 
acknowledging that it is the storyteller who, within limits and contingent 
on his or her ability, decides what happens in the story he or she is going 
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to tell, including events that need not, for various reasons, be related 
directly in the text” (1998 p. 844).  
Livingston in this passage refers to the creative process and stresses how important the 
constitutive role of the artist is in interpretation. He says that the artist is the storyteller – 
the work maker – and the one who communicates her story to the reader. It is true that the 
artist decides on her artwork but Livingston here seems to articulate his claim as if this is 
were readily clear. That is to say, he appears to assume that intentions are sort of 
reasonably applied; he says within ‘natural and logical limits’ the artist chooses, decides, 
tells. His considerations give the impression of being briefly speculative; he does not 
analyze the creative process in order to deeply appreciate what the creative process 
encompasses and how the artist actually executes her intentions which will be subsequently 
interpreted.  Additionally, while he mentions ‘natural and logical limits’ – an important 
notion within intending to be making art – he does not explain it in order to give a glimpse 
into what this limits may involve. This leaves the expression of intention indeterminate and 
outruns other artistic states surrounding the artist (this account seems to assume that artists 
are only surrounded by intentions).  
The following example by Paul Klee aims to support the above kind of inspiration as 
euphoria of production and add to MAI that the expression of intention in art making is not 
as clearly employed as it might be in everyday actions, and thus the ‘communicative 
model’ Livingston refers to might not apply to the artist always intending to communicate 
something, and knowing what the result of the expression will be. Klee stresses the 
subjective character of the artist’s inspiration and how graphic elements (like dot, line, 
plane and space) are put into action by an ‘energy discharged within the artist’s mind’. He 
highlights the dynamic nature of art by saying that:  
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“Pictorial art springs from movement, is itself fixed movement, and is 
perceived through movements… The creative impulse suddenly springs to 
life, like a flame, passes through the hand on the canvas, where it spreads 
farther until, like the spark that closes an electric circuit, it returns to the 
source: the eye and the mind” (Read, p. 182).  
 
Klee states that the crucial formative process performed by movements occurs below the 
level of awareness and that some things in painting cannot be explained. He adds that: “a 
composition is an image of creation itself – ‘Genesis eternal’, a penetration by human 
consciousness to ‘that secret place where primaeval power nurtures all evolution’” (Read, 
pp. 186-187). He offers a more detailed account about the artistic process and describes the 
transformations or deformations that the visual image goes through until it develops to a 
significant representation:  
“The artist has busied himself with this multiform world and has in some 
measure got his bearing in it, quietly, all by himself. He is so well oriented 
that he can put order into the flux of phenomena and experiences. This sense 
of direction in nature and life, this branching and spreading array, I shall 
compare with the root of the tree.  
‘From the root the sap rises up into the artist, flows through him, flows  
through him, flows to his eye. ‘He is the trunk of the tree. ‘Overwhelmed and 
activated by the force of the current, he conveys his vision into his work. ‘In 
full view of the world, the crown of the tree unfolds and spreads in time and 
in space, and so with his work. Nobody will expect a tree to form its crown in 
exactly the same way as its root. Between above and below there cannot be 
exact mirror images of each other. It is obvious that different action operating 
in different elements must produce vital divergences. ‘But it is just the artist 
who at times is denied those departures from nature which his art demands. 
He was even been accused of incompetence and deliberate distortion. ‘And 
yet, standing at his appointed place, as the trunk of the tree, he does nothing 
other than gather and pass on what rises from the depths. He neither serves 
nor commands – he transmits. ‘His position is humble. And the beauty at the 
crown is not his own; it has merely passed through him’” (Read, pp. 182-
186).    
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This account seems to emphasize that sometimes an artist knows what action she is doing 
without knowing about the physical action by which she executes it; she paints a painting 
without knowing how and why this takes the form it takes. Klee talks about a sense of 
direction in life and nature which penetrates the artist and activates him to convey his 
vision into work through his way. He transmits what has arisen to him, which Klee claims 
that does not belong to him, it just passes through the artist and is conveyed through the 
work. My view is that his account of flow highlights the fact that he does not know how 
and why this happens to him. It looks as if this is an unexplained sort of situation and does 
not in fact offer meaningful grounds as to why an artist has painted a work. It actually 
appears to be a bizarre account which someone could easily dismiss as it does not really 
constitute a logical explanation of intentional action on the part of the artist.   
(iii) Invoked inspiration  
The third kind of inspiration in painting is ‘invoked inspiration’ and it differs from the first 
two in the degree of intentional intensity – this one is intentionally and consciously 
invoked – it does not come uninvited to the artist as the first two. Inspiration in this case is 
closely related to the notion of ideas generation. This is a process where the artist 
intentionally wishes to get inspired and therefore uses various mental and material 
techniques together in order to achieve a state of inspiration. Mental techniques are those 
like brainstorming, using memory, association or disassociation, displacing things or 
situations and placing them in an another context or vice versa, exercising abstract or 
lateral thinking, searching a specific thing or concept, transforming something that is 
concrete to something vague or vice versa, staring at an object until various things and 
situations come to her mind, and so on. Material techniques concern various materials, 
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tools and processes which the artist practices. Both mental and material techniques can 
help one another or they can happen at the same time automatically and they are both a 
request for generation or invention of ideas.  
There can be endless techniques: for example, surrealists
9
 have intentionally used drugs in 
order to stimulate the unconscious and thus generate ideas which would eventually lead to 
art making. Automatic writing was one of the most widespread techniques to stimulate 
creative urges. It is the practice of writing down as quickly as possible without revising 
what is written and without the control of reason. The aim was to write down all these that 
passed through the author’s mind when she was able to disengage herself from the world 
outside. The target of this technique was to lay bare the ‘mental matter’ and disconnect it 
from thought (Alexandrian 1995, p. 47). Automatic writing techniques were used for 
painting and drawing: artists were painting directly on the painting without making 
preliminary sketches prior to the work that was to follow.    
The issue at examination here is that it is difficult to equate the wilful search for ideas with 
intention as a justified reason for painting. This is because in following Anscombe’s model 
of reason giving, we cannot give a reason as to why specific ideas come to the mind even 
when they are intentionally invoked. They come about because we consciously intend to 
invoke them but there is no logical explanation about why these specific ideas came about 
(and why other different ideas did not come about); they come out of reflex, as a reaction 
                                                          
9
 In surrealism artists experimented a lot with automatism, games, chance, coincidence, error and surprise 
and were liberated of any kind of aesthetic and moral concerns. They sought after to disturb conscious 
thought by the use of irrationality, fantasy, analysis of dreams, the absurd, nonsense and desired a trance and 
ecstatic states when painting in order to achieve thought that is not controlled by reason. In order to reach this 
state they made use of drugs and strong stimulants. They were open to the exploration of the subconscious, 
the unknown and to the total liberation of imagination. Another important characteristic of surrealists is that 
they avoided being literary and were encouraged to paint in a spontaneous state of expression and to create 
directly on the painting (Alexandrian 1995, p. 7, 31, 46, 67). 
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to the appeal for inspiration, as it seems to be true of most ideas. Reflex itself does not 
seem to count as a reason for intending in painting. In everyday actions we if were to ask 
someone ‘Why do you raise your hand?’ and the reply is ‘Because I want to pick up 
something’, there is an explanation as to why the agent raises her hand. It can be said that 
at some point after asking successive questions about ‘why did you do that?’ explanation 
will stop at some point. The idea is that invoking inspiration which results in painting is an 
artist’s job – this is what she does and she does not want to scrutinize her actions. The idea 
of practice and individual decisions when someone is an artist work like that because this 
is her job – this is what she does. It is a similar activity to the one of priest drinking 
communion. It is his job to do that and he does not scrutinize his action because this is 
what he does, this is part of his job and he does not need explanation as to why he does 
that. The contrast between intending to invoke inspiration with intentions in everyday 
actions in Anscombe’s approach is that in the case of consciously invoking an idea the 
artist does not know what it is to come. However, in the case when an agent intends to 
raise her hand she knows she is doing this because she want to pick up something – she 
knows that her hand will go up and will enable her to pick X (unless she suddenly feels 
weak or she is physically unable to do that). In painting, an artist does not know the 
outcome of her endeavour when she invokes ideas. And she also does not know how the 
idea is going to eventually look like when put on canvas by the use of certain means and 
materials. Artists intend to invoke ideas but they do not know what idea they will have and 
how the idea will be formed. We can intend to produce ideas, but we cannot intend the idea 
itself because an idea is unknown until it is thought of. Theoretically, intention to generate 
ideas is indeed intentional: ‘I intend to generate ideas about theme A’. But the generation 
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of ideas itself when practiced in the mind or directly on canvas, that is to say, the result of 
the generation of ideas, is unforeseen; it is an act of generation, the birth of an idea that is 
yet not known. The generation of ideas on a first level and its application on a second level 
is a startling challenge for the artist and the outcome remains indeterminate until it is 
practically performed.  
The three kinds of inspiration suggest that inspiration of the first two cases comes 
unexpectedly to the artist’s mind and that even when it is invoked, as in the third case, it is 
unpredictable. What this examination amounts to is to highlight the fact that the artist does 
not really know why she paints pictures that uninvited come to her mind and based on this, 
stating that she does not know why, then for the viewer the artist’s statement does not point 
to a meaningful interpretation. This kind of state, does not stand on the same level as the 
expression of intention in everyday actions.  
2. Desire  
Another important state that surrounds the artist is desire. This is divided in unconscious 
desire to paint and conscious desire to paint for pleasure. Below there is an account of 
desire by Anscombe which is used to illuminate how the expression of desire in everyday 
actions, being conceived of as intention, differs from the notion of desire in art making.   
 
Anscombe states that it is tempting to think of intentions as mental states which are 
independent of intentional actions, assuming that this is because there can be fully formed 
intentions which do not result in intentional actions (pp. 8-10). However, she strongly 
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wants to rebut the idea that intentions are mental states only and asserts that we cannot 
understand intentions to act independently of intentional action. In particular, she says:  
“… a man can form an intention which he then does nothing to carry out, 
either because he is prevented, or because he changes his mind: but the 
intention itself can be complete, although it remains a purely interior thing. 
All this comprises to make us think that if we want to know a man’s 
intentions it is into the contents of his mind, and only into these, that we 
must inquire; and hence, that if we wish what intention is, we must be 
investigating something whose existence is purely in the sphere of the mind; 
and that although intentions issue in actions, and the way this happens also 
presents interesting questions, still what physically takes place, i.e. what a 
man actually does, is the very last thing we need consider in our inquiry. 
Whereas I wish to say that it is the first.” (p. 9). 
 
Through the above quote Anscombe argues that intentions are mental states which are 
unbreakably connected with intentional action; she perceives intention to be intending to 
be doing. She places a lot of emphasis on this conception by distancing herself from 
previous philosophical discussions which maintain that intentions are mental states which 
take place contingently and which are hard to know or to know at all. In addition to that, 
she denies the possibility of doing without intending, but she does not deny intending 
without doing.  
It is true from Anscombe’s observations that there are cases where everyday actions are 
indeed the result of conscious intending. Nonetheless, it does not seem persuasive that the 
theory of intending as doing is always true because it is doubtful whether all actions are 
executed because of a reason and in extension because of an intention. A preliminary 
worry about her claim is that it seems to leave the implication that all actions are preceded 
by intention. In other words, someone is executing an action because she intends so.  
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Let us use the following example of everyday action to speculate to what degree actions 
need be the result of intentions. According to Anscombe’s model, it seems natural to infer 
that the fact that an agent bites her nails shows that her intention is to bite her nails. All the 
same, it is possible that her action does not entail that she intends to do so. She indeed bites 
her nails, and this is what her action itself manifests, but at the same time it can be true that 
on the contrary she does not intend to bite them and consciously aims to quit this; however, 
in unexpected moments an impulse or unconscious need pushes her to do it without really 
and consciously intending to be doing so. If we conceive of impulse as an unconscious 
state which cannot be justified by reason then it seems natural to suggest that this state is 
not intentional and thus the assumption that actions followed by such states do not always 
show the intention behind it. By contrast, according to Anscombe’s view this kind of 
impulse or desire is perceived as intention. She contends that some reasons for action may 
never become conscious and that desire (being a reason) might not manifest itself as any 
specific conscious event which made someone pursue a certain action; in such cases only 
the action is manifest (2000, p. 17). For example, someone who desires for apples might 
make one get some, but the desire might not be conscious in the mind of the agent. This 
suggests that the agent’s action (that she has finally eaten apples) indicates the reason and 
thus her desire to eat apples, despite the fact that she was not conscious of her desire for 
apples. The fact that an agent finally eats apples because she desires so and is unconscious 
of that, her actual act of eating apples is not based on chance. She feels a biological drive 
to eat apples which leads to the specific act of eating apples.  
The above discussion used alongside Anscombe’s theory of intending to be doing is not 
principally used to reject Anscombe’s theory of intention per se but to reinforce the view 
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that, even assuming she were right about intentions in everyday actions, intentions in 
everyday actions are expressed in a different way than in art making and as such they are 
also differently interpreted. Anscombe’s allegation that an intentional action of doing A is 
the execution of a prior intention to do A, as it has already been mentioned, is constituted 
by the idea that not all actions are executed for a reason in art making. It may be the case 
that an artist paints out of unconscious desire without any prior planning of depicting a 
picture in specific, but rather to paint out of desire, in which case she is doing that without 
consciously intending to be doing so and without having decided to paint something 
specific in advance.  
(i) Unconscious desire to paint  
The first doubt about all actions being intentional in art making applies more pointedly to 
the state of spontaneous action as a result of unconscious desire to paint which is hard to be 
perceived as intentional. Spontaneity in art-making is a state where the artist acts without 
having prior intentions and lets herself, means and material act freely according to chance 
and without a plan. Spontaneity is linked to automatism, a situation where the artist is 
typically not aware of ‘why’ she is performing a specific action (i.e. applying green instead 
of yellow without any specific prior intention or reason for that action). This appears to be 
at odds with Knapp and Michaels view of intentionalism who contend that it is hard to 
imagine that there is in fact intentionless meaning. In particular, they claim: 
 “How difficult it is to imagine a case of intentionless meaning… From 
the standpoint of an argument against critical theory, then, the only 
important question is whether there can in fact be intentionless 
meanings. If our argument against theory is to succeed, the answer to 
this question must be no” (1992 p. 54). 
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Some representative samples of automatism constituted by surrealism and dada, as it has 
been mentioned in the previous section, as well as from abstract expressionists
10
 appear to 
disagree with Knapp and Michaels’ view. The following examples from painting suggest 
that in art making it is possible to have intentionless meaning in the sense offered below. 
To begin with, automatism, besides being a kind to invoke inspiration, it might have also 
been the result of unconscious desire to paint for the sake of painting since subject-matter 
and objective meaning was not of much importance to surrealists and abstract 
expressionists; what mattered to them mostly was the automatic creation and the 
exploration of the unconscious. Automatism was a key step to creation, and the use of 
drugs or other illusionary substances were important for the promotion of the desirable 
state of the unconscious. Characteristically, André Breton defines surrealism as “a kind of 
psychic automatism which corresponds very closely to a dream state” and asserts that “the 
vice of surrealism is the uncontrolled and impassioned use of the drug image”. The result 
of dream states and uncontrollable uses of an image yield a plethora of other unexpected 
images (Alexandrian 1995, p. 47).  
On the same path, Jackson Pollock who was part of abstract expressionism stated that:  
“My painting does not come from the easel. I hardly ever stretch my canvas 
before painting. I prefer to tack the unstretched canvas to the hard wall or the 
floor. I need the resistance of a hard surface. On the floor I am more at ease. I 
feel nearer, more a part of the painting, since this way I can walk around it, 
work from the four sides and literary be in the painting … I approach painting 
the same way I approach drawing, that is, direct. No sketches / acceptance of / 
what I do –.”  (Landau 1989 p. 168-169). 
                                                          
10
 Abstract expressionism is concerned with the non-figurative and with action painting. Artists dripped, 
threw or splashed paint on the canvas through quick gestures and moves of the hand and they ‘acted’ on the 
canvas by the spontaneously and automatically improvising the image while making the image. They desired 
expressiveness, vitality, energy, the release of the unconscious and personal expression to be articulated on 
the canvas. The focus on the act of pure painting is fundamental and the artist’s experience while painting is 
much more important than the picture produced (Landau 1989, p. 26). 
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His statement indicates his desire to work directly and spontaneously on the canvas 
without thinking about and planning in advance what his actions would be when he would 
be painting. His desire was to paint for the sake of painting without thinking in advance to 
create a meaningful image.  
In view of these cases, it is quite likely that automatism undermines the notion of the 
artist’s conscious intentions. Automatism is rather constituted by unconscious desire to 
paint and in some movements like surrealism to paint just for the sake of painting. 
Surrealist and abstract expressionist examples appear to be significantly different from 
some examples of everyday actions which can be preceded by concrete and conscious 
intentions (i.e. intending to watch a film or read a book). These issues render EAI and 
Anscombe’s model difficult to endorse with regard to painting process as in desire to paint 
(or to paint for the sake of painting) artists are often possessed by unconscious intentions 
and unknown plans which are not directed to the creation of a meaningful representation. 
This suggests that artists often perform unintentional actions and they sometimes act 
impulsively and without reason giving because their intentions are unconscious. As a 
result, this implies that there can be actions without intentions by contrast to Anscombe’s 
view which seems to deny the possibility of doing without intending, but she does not deny 
intending without doing.  
This view is further supported by the fact that in the context of surrealism and dada it can 
be more difficult to find criticism on what specific paintings mean since the paintings were 
supposed to be executed subconsciously. Critics refer to those movements and what the 
movements declared, but they usually do not say that specific paintings mean specific 
things, as they do with reference to Renaissance or Romantic painting for instance. There 
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are cases where specific names are mentioned in the descriptions of some paintings, like 
i.e. when Dali’s wife Gala is depicted, but usually description does not work in the same 
way as does in the aforementioned movements. Besides movements like surrealism and 
dada, which deliberately advocate the importance of the unconscious mind of the artist, it 
should be highlighted that what applies to surrealists applies to many more traditional 
artists as well.  
 
Taking into consideration these issues and artists’ unconscious states, it seems natural to 
suppose that painting which comes out of desire to paint is perplexing to the viewer since 
the artist herself is not (fully) aware of what she is being producing (besides her 
uninterestedness for subject-matter). Nevertheless, this does not imply that this kind of 
painting cannot be understood since there are many other aspects that help the viewer like 
the visual aspects and the ambiance of work. This will be analysed later in chapter 6. 
Such conception of desire – perceived as unconscious intention – relates to Schueler’s 
view that desires such as biological drives are not intentional and thus do not have a clear 
explanation as to why they happen. Desires are thought to be propositional attitudes, like 
for example in desiring a person says: ‘A desires (or wants) that B’ or ‘A desires (or wants) 
to see her sister’. In this case if one asks why A wants to see her sister, she could say 
because she got married and this would explain her desire, and her possible resulting 
action, of desiring to see her sister. Schueler suggests this kind of desire is intentional. 
However, he claims that there are kinds of desire that are not intentional like for example 
biological drives of hunger, thirst, sexual desire and many more (1995, pp. 9-14). This 
leads him to distinguish between the impulsive and deliberate case of desire. The impulsive 
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case takes place when someone does not think of what she is doing and the deliberate when 
she does. He gives the following example. In the impulsive case, an agent walks through 
the kitchen a jar of chocolates catches her eye, she feels a craving and without breaking her 
train of thought she takes chocolates and eats them. In the deliberate case, as she walks 
through the kitchen a jar of chocolates catches her eye, she feels a craving but momentarily 
she stops the train of her thought and remembers that chocolates are fattening and bad for 
teeth and she takes the chocolates and eats them. The difference between these cases is 
mental, because the actual physical movements and actions are the same (pp. 174-75).  
With this example in mind, I argue that while an artist’s paints for the sake of painting that 
this very action might come out of impulsive desire (though not in the strict biological 
sense of desire like hunger or thirst) and as a result of this the artist is unaware of the 
resulting representation. It should be noted that this is something that does not only happen 
a lot in surrealism, dada and abstract expressionism but also in all genres of painting like 
figurative and realistic painting. Sometimes when artists work they get entirely captivated 
by their desire to paint that they are unaware of what they paint. Characteristically, Pollock 
said that:  
“When I am in my painting, I am not aware of what I am doing. It is only 
after a sort of ‘get acquainted’ period that I see what I have been about… the 
painting has a life of its own. I try to let it come through. It is only when I 
loose contact with the painting that the result is a mess. Otherwise there is a 
total harmony, an easy give and take, and the painting comes out well” 
(Landau 1989, p. 168).  
His action can be characterized as impulsive because he feels that he desires to paint but 
does not paint with specific intentions to mean in specific ways. For instance, Pollock in 
painting a red and blue doodle the action is manifest, but he does not know about his desire 
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to paint a red and blue doodle because his desire is based on spontaneous action. This 
suggests that sometimes desire relies on chance or accident rather than on a logical planned 
process that will bring about foreseeable results like the result of one raising her arm. 
(ii) Conscious desire to paint for pleasure  
The second kind of desire concerns the aspect of desire to paint for pleasure and it differs 
from the first kind in that this one can be deliberate. Desire to paint for pleasure involves a 
feeling to paint without having any specific objective other than the act of painting itself 
for pure enjoyment. In other words, sometimes artists carry out the act of painting in order 
to fulfil their desire to just paint for pleasure. I hold that in such cases the artist wishes to 
experience pure pleasure, and on a second level to meaningfully represent things to 
viewers. This concerns cases in which the artist intends to derive pleasure from the process 
of making and thus she might not be concerned as much with what her representation will 
ultimately be like. This state conflicts with Anscombe’s claim that all actions are 
intentional, because as will see in this section despite the fact that desire to paint for 
pleasure is conscious, the outcome is not concrete enough to be called intentional. It is a 
pleasure to be meaningful but without intending the meaning (or meaningfully intending).   
Let us see how this relates to artist’s execution of this kind of state. Thomas Benton in his 
memoirs, who was one of Pollock’s mentors, described his attitude to painting in the 
following way:  
“A mural is for me a kind of emotional spree... A certain kind of thoughtless 
freedom comes over me. I don’t give a damn about anything. Once on the 
wall, I paint with downright pleasure” (Landau 1989, p. 26). 
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In addition to this, surrealist experiments and games produced a kind of intoxication and 
exhilaration to artists. Francis Picabia was passionate with pleasure in art and stated he 
made use of painting as a trigger for ‘giddy and perilous leaps’ (Alexandrian 1995, pp. 41-
47).  
 
These situations emphasize the fact that artists often desire to pursue the experience of 
pleasure through the creative process without intending to be meaningful in a specific way. 
When an artist desires to paint for pleasure, in which case it may count as reason to paint, 
therefore as intention, this intention is not meaningful to the viewer. It is a kind of pleasure 
to be meaningful. This is where the difficulty lies with conceiving of the expression of 
intention in painting in the way it would be in everyday actions. Once this action is 
undertaken solely for the artist’s pleasure and it is only meaningful to her in terms of 
pleasure, then it is difficult for the viewer to count it as useful for her interpretation since 
there is no meaningful explanation as to why the artist has executed this. The action itself – 
and thus the finished artwork – does not manifest the intention for pleasure on the part of 
the viewer as it can be the case when an agent watches a film in which case we can say 
more clearly that she intends to be watching a film. It is not the intention in nature that 
differs in art making, mentally the intention is the same as in everyday actions, it is the 
execution and the expression of it that creates difficulties in interpreting it like in the 
instances of everyday actions.    
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3. Experimentation  
As it has been mentioned previously, artists have intentions, either general or specific, 
categorical or semantic and so on. Despite these kinds of intentions, artists very often 
intend to experiment and experimentation constitutes another very crucial part of the 
artist’s creative process. In painting, experimentation involves a practical action of 
investigational manipulation of materials, tools, processes and techniques. It rests a lot on 
the creation and invention of new things, on combination, chance, error, accident and 
coincidence. It is the ‘trying out’ of conceptions together with materials and in this process 
there are numerous possibilities – and impossibilities can be made possible and restrictions 
can be ignored. Sometimes experimentation for artists is like playing. It is comparable with 
a child when she plays, where she invents what she plays while she plays; similarly, an 
artist invents what she paints while she paints. The intention to experiment is a state that 
can be clear in the mind of the artist: the fact that she will experiment as soon as she begins 
the work or before beginning as well as the media or the colours she will use which she can 
decide prior to beginning the work. That is, experimentation itself is an intentional action 
and it can be conscious. Nevertheless, in the realm of art making and hence its expression 
it is to be perceived in the same way as inspiration and desire for the following reasons.  
 
It is important to highlight that for the artist, painting is not only the finished work but also 
the process of getting there. Therefore, experimentation, being an essential process to reach 
the production of painting, is a marvelous and challenging venture for the artist, one which 
she might intend theoretically but which she does not know what results will bring when 
practiced. It gives her excitement, enthusiasm and agony for it leads her to unknown 
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situations like techniques, skills and processes, since the intention to experiment is for her 
like an exploration of possibilities, impossibilities and limitations. On the one hand, 
experimentation is intentional, that is to say, an artist mentally intends (when she thinks 
she wants and will experiment) and practically (when she actually experiments). On the 
other hand the very act of experimentation (that which actually comes out) is spontaneous, 
unplanned and frequently accidental. An artist cannot only experiment in the mind. For 
example, she can mentally think of various combinations and materials and possible 
actions she will undertake prior to beginning working but in order to produce the work she 
has to also experiment in practice. This kind of intention can be called an intention not to 
definitely intend in some direction beforehand, since the intention for an unplanned 
process and application, which explores possibilities and limits, is an intention which leads 
to unknown actions and end-results. This proposes that it is difficult to intend the process 
and the outcome of experimentation, while in everyday actions as mentioned previously in 
this chapter, the process and end-result is clearer to the mind of the agent before executing 
an action. The way an artist will experiment and what will result out of her experimentation 
is unpredictable, despite the fact that she may decide what materials and tools she will use 
in advance. The outcomes of experimentation are hard to foresee, that is why 
experimentation is called experimentation in the first place; because it unclear what form 
its outcomes will have.  
By way of example, Max Ernst’s approaches to experimentation led him to devise new 
techniques he was not aware of before starting to experiment. He used to endorse visions 
of the half-sleeping and half-waking state as in that way he believed he could explore his 
subconscious. In intending to paint, by employing this state which he thought of as part of 
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experimentation, he did not know what techniques he would find in his way to achieve 
this. His faculty of seeing visions led him to invent collage, in which he used different 
figures from illustrated catalogues to reach the ‘alchemy of the visual image’; he defined 
this practice as “the exploitation of the chance meeting of two remote realities on a plane 
unsuitable to them”. By experimenting he also discovered frottage: 
“On 10 August 1925, in a seaside inn, he was seized by an obsession with 
the grooves in the graining of the floorboards. He placed a piece of paper 
on the boards and rubbed it with blacklead so as to obtain a tracing. And 
from this tracing an image arose whose shape became clear to him. 
Frottages suggested to him forests, pampas, hordes of animals, heads … 
From this time on he regarded frottage as ‘the true equivalent of what we 
already know as automatic writing’” (Alexandrian 1995, p. 62-64).  
This seems to imply that before Ernst began painting, he had intentions which could be 
clear in his mind (like to experiment with paper, to use blacklead and to be automatic) but 
the process which led to the invention of collage and frottage was unfamiliar to him until 
the moment he actually processed them through practice.       
The unpredictability of results through the application of materials is ample in the realm of 
painting. For instance, intentional splashes or drops of paint on canvas produce fortuitous 
patches and shapes since it is uncontrollable to some degree how the splash or the drop will 
develop on the canvas. In his paintings, Yves Klein sometimes used to burn some part of 
the canvas without knowing what shape the burn would actually take at the end; that is to 
say, he intended the burning but did not intend and did not know the shape the burn would 
finally take. The final shape and form of the burn was the result of his experimentation to 
produce a burn on the painting (he intentionally burned the canvas but he did not know that 
his burning process would produce the specific resulting shape).  
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Similarly, when an artist for example intends to paint about solitude she may know that she 
intends the painting to be about solitude and may also roughly know how she will depict 
her conception of solitude (in what technique, colours and shapes) and in which position 
she will put some elements on the canvas. However, in the course of experimentation the 
artist does not know what form her painting will take (despite the fact that she may know 
that the subject she intends to depict is solitude). It is the practice itself that produces the 
experimentation, the subject and the representation of a painting. 
What I claim here is that the implementation of intentions in experimentation is different 
from that in everyday actions, as intentions in everyday actions are expressed in other ways 
and their end-result is more predictable or manifest to another agent than it is in the 
interpretation of artistic intentions. Let us take an example from intention in everyday 
actions which will be transformed into an intention to create art in order to clarify their 
difference in nature more clearly. In an everyday action an agent intends to raise her arm in 
order to pick up something from the cupboard. She can do that by lifting her arm quickly, 
slowly, in a straight way, in an interrupted way or in small circular movements and so on, 
according to her physical stature and abilities. In all these different ways she expresses her 
intention to get something from the cupboard and the end-result of the intention is known 
to her prior to raising her arm: the arm will go up in one of the ways (or other ways) just 
cited and finally reach the cupboard. At most probabilities the way she will raise her arm is 
not of much concern for her; what is important for her is to raise her arm in order to pick 
something. She may also not even think about the way she will raise her arm, she will do it 
in any way it comes naturally at that moment since her intention is to pick up something 
from the cupboard.  
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In the case of the creating process the nature of intention differs in the following respects. 
Let us continue with the example of raising the arm but this time to suppose that the agent 
is an artist who intends to create. This is not an example of painting, but an example which 
can be classified under the category of performance art – yet it will help elucidate the 
difference claimed here. In the course of this endeavor, the artist intends to raise her arm, 
not to raise it in order to pick up something from the cupboard because she wants 
something from there, but instead she wants to raise it in order to see in how many possible 
ways and speeds one can do that and what skills she can apply or develop in order to 
execute this. Her ultimate intention is not to raise it in order to pick up something, but to 
explore the process and possibilities of raising her arm. Such intentions of the latter case 
fall in the realm of art experimentation rather than of everyday actions. This is because the 
artist places herself in a mental and physical condition where she tries to search in how 
many different ways she can raise her hand for the sake of raising it (not to pick up 
something from the cupboard). In this case she experiments since she does not know in 
how many possible ways one can perform this action. By contrast to the intention in 
everyday actions, the process in this case is very important since it is the process which 
will eventually show in what and how many ways this action can be achieved. Despite the 
fact that in this case the end-result is to a certain degree predictable (the arm will finally go 
up in one way or another), the way intention can be expressed in the course of the process 
to execute the intention is unpredictable, explorative, volatile and chanceful for the artist. 
The distinction here between everyday actions and painting is that in the intentions to raise 
one’s hand the agent knows that after her intention to raise her hand is executed she will 
raise it (her intention is targeted towards something specific, namely, raising her arm; she 
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knows how to execute this action and what will be the effect). In art, it is the practice itself 
that produces the experimentation, the subject and the performance of the work. This 
suggests that the intention to raise one’s arm does not boil down to a challenging act for 
the agent as she knows the end-result, whereas for the artist the intention to experiment in 
various ways is utterly stimulating due to its unknowability. To further support this, I cite 
the following statement by Lucian Freud: 
“I think half the point of painting a picture is that you don’t know what will 
happen. Perhaps if painters did know how it was going to turn out they 
wouldn’t bother actually to do it” (Gayford 2010, p. 83).  
 
His statement seems to defend that the final representation a painting will have is unknown 
to the artist; nevertheless, the artist yearns for this kind of process and in fact, as mentioned 
in the previous section, she enjoys the making of painting and experiences great pleasure in 
it.  
A last hypothesis concerning the difference in the nature and expression of intentions in 
everyday actions and painting is approached again through Anscombe’s definition of 
intentional action. She claims that one of the criteria of intentional action is non-
observational knowledge, that is to say, an intentional action is that which the agent knows 
she is doing without having to look. While in some examples she gives this may apply, in 
painting the case of non-observational knowledge fails. For instance, an artist who intends 
to paint a landscape puts effort to paint it by experimenting in the use of materials and 
techniques. She can sense the movements of her hand and touch the materials she uses 
without looking. But the end-result of how the landscape is painted is not something that is 
attached to her body, it is out of it and therefore, it is something she has to look at (i.e. it is 
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not like when we know the position of our limbs without having to look). In painting, the 
artist has to look in order to know what she is painting and the visual contact with painting 
is one of the necessities of experiencing painting itself. While the artist intentionally and 
physically experiments in painting a landscape she does not have non-observational 
knowledge that she is doing that (she has knowledge through observation). If she closes 
her eyes in order to have non-observational knowledge through the movements of her hand 
as part of her experimentation, she still has to witness the result by looking.  
Conclusion  
The issue of this chapter revolved around the argument that to act intentionally in everyday 
actions functions differently than acting intentionally in painting. Admittedly, artists have 
intentions but often the execution of their intentions involves reasons for acting which are 
not as clear as those of the execution of everyday actions. Inspiration, desire and intention 
to experiment are different in nature because they cannot be as clearly justified as in 
everyday actions. As it has been pointed out earlier the difference between intentions in 
everyday actions and artistic intentions, is not mental but actual – it is based on the 
expression of that action. While executed, artistic intentions develop through unknown 
ways and have unpredictable results by contrast to the execution of intention in everyday 
actions. That is what makes artistic intentions not as apparent as intentions in everyday 
actions. Also, part of the difficulty with equating application of artistic intentions with 
intentions in everyday actions lies in the use and articulation of the artistic medium
11
 which 
(sometimes) makes the expression of intentions arcane to the artist herself. They are not as 
concrete in nature as they might be in everyday actions as they involve a sense of volatility 
                                                          
11
 The use of the medium will be examined in chapter 6, part I, section 2 
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and changeability at the time they are being employed. In intending while painting, the 
artist experiences limits and possibilities, the production of form, development and 
transformation, the occurrence of images which are not besought and unawareness as to 
where they come from and how they reach the mind. These states and actions cannot be 
approached in the same way as the cases of raising one’s arm for example. They involve a 
more complex account of intention as action and expression than that provided for 
everyday actions. Artistic intentions, states and actions are infused by a sense of 
exploration where the end-result is mysterious and the process of making is variable and 
very important. This suggests that if artistic intentions are encompassing states and artists’ 
actions cannot be explained even by artists’ then knowledge of them on the part of the 
viewer might not be valuable in that they do not always provide an enlightening ground for 
meaningful interpretation.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Are artist’s intentions apparent in her work?  
After the examination of some of the artist’s mental states and actions in the previous 
chapter, it is crucial to examine to what degree the viewer grasps the artist’s intentions. It 
seems that according to the MAI model of interpretation, artist’s intentions are apparent 
through her work. In addition to maintaining that the artist’s intentions are apparent in the 
work, MA intentionalists also claim that in order to access artist’s intentions viewers can 
use other supplementary sources other than only looking at the painting, like reading the 
title, the artist’s diaries, biography, interviews or statements, cultural background 
surrounding the painting and so on. In this chapter, I will examine the degree of 
appearance of the artist’s intentions in painting and to what degree the viewer can grasp 
them based on the representation of the painting. To approach this – further to the 
exploration of inspiration, desire and experimentation – it is important to examine in the 
first part what an artist may do when she makes a painting as this will help better 
understand whether her intentions are apparent in her work. In the second part, there is a 
presentation of some of Anscombe’s speculations over the issue of the manifestation of 
intention through action and eventually some examples which aim to examine to what 
degree a viewer can grasp intentions based on their appearance in painting. The last section 
of the second part discusses the appearance of the artist’s intentions in her work – and 
therefore her success in representing them – with relation to the value of painting when 
those intentions are not apparent in the work.  
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I.  
Some remarks about what an artist does when she makes a painting   
Along with the artist’s states and actions discussed in the previous chapter, an artist may 
also wish to paint for several other reasons like representing, understanding, exploring, 
creating, combining, making something present, formulating through pigments or bringing 
forth a new picture, agony, pain, suffering and so on. She creates in order to understand the 
world and to make sense of certain things. She is deeply concerned with inner perceptions 
and intuitions and has a desire to reach truth. In her effort to reach that, she practically uses 
methods, materials, means and processes. Among others, she practices imagination, 
creativity, ingenuity, insight and originality. An artist sometimes has conscious intentions 
and other times she is not aware of what she will do or how her work will develop. She is 
surrounded by states like spontaneity, desire, inspiration and experimentation and she can 
be intrigued and motivated by anything. It is very important to emphasize that for the artist, 
making a painting can be for pure enjoyment and pleasure, sharing, exploration, experience 
or torment. She has questions, is curious, is seeking something and sometimes painting 
may help her to gain knowledge and understanding of the world and of herself. She 
creates, designs and reconstructs the world. She explores how parts of the world interrelate 
and examines how our perceptions of the world are structured. She visualizes, she is the 
creator of new pictures, either pictures of the directly visible world or of her mind; she 
shows how she perceives the world. There is creativity and plasticity in the process of 
making her work. She experiments and uses material in her own way in order to produce 
painting and in order to make sense of that which she wishes to explore or show.  
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Now let us we examine the issue of what an artist may do when she paints more 
specifically. There are cases where the artist while painting might consciously wish to 
communicate something to her viewers and thus try to make her intentions as apparent as 
possible. Thus, sometimes intentions are easily detected.  There are other cases where she 
consciously thinks that what she paints might be difficult for the viewer to understand and 
she is uninterested about changing her mind to paint it otherwise in order to be more easily 
understood. So it seems that sometimes it is difficult to say the intentions by just looking. 
At other times, what viewers will understand may not even cross her mind at the time she 
paints. Here, we emphasize the last two cases.  
These observations suggest that sometimes the artist is so powerfully captivated by the 
creative process and the pleasure this brings with it that she may not change either her 
concept or the way she explores it (the medium and her skill) in order to make the end-
result (the painting) more easily accessible to the viewers. This does not imply that it can 
never be the case that the artist wishes to communicate something to her viewers and to 
consciously pursue that. Sometimes it can be the case that if she wants to explore 
something she will most probably not change the process she explores it in order to make it 
more accessible to the viewer. This takes place for the reason that the artist is usually 
strongly concerned about how things are firstly represented to her and how she understands 
them and then about how they are represented to viewers (this is deeply due to the factor of 
process).
12
  
To clarify the above contention, we use the following analogy between the artist and the 
philosopher. Like the artist, the philosopher can make philosophy because she wishes to 
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 The issue of process is discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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explore something, to understand the world, search truth (and thus to represent things to 
herself) and because she may find pleasure and importance in it. A plausible difference 
between the two practices is that in producing philosophy, by contrast to making a 
painting, the philosopher puts more emphasis on manifesting her intentions since her only 
tool is language (there is specific sense which she cannot distort or use a variety of 
techniques like i.e. in painting or poetry, despite the fact that poetry uses language too) and 
if she wishes to be understood by readers she will have to be clear and develop her 
syllogism as explicitly as possible. For instance, the artist can be drunk or drugged when 
producing a painting which she aims to exhibit, but the philosopher is just not drunk when 
she writes or edits work for publication. Otherwise, her readers will not be able to properly 
understand her work. In poetry, despite the fact that the only tool is language, there is more 
flexibility with regard to understanding the meaning of it than in reading a philosophical 
text. A poet can more easily escape language than a philosopher. In a sense, a 
philosophical text cannot be understood as one likes, therefore, this may prompt the 
philosopher to wish to express her intentions with more clarity and to change what she 
writes in order to make her work better understood by readers. Conversely, the artist may 
ignore her intentions for the sake of leaving something she instantly made the way it is 
because she simply likes it. The philosopher wishes to be understandable by someone else. 
For the philosopher it is more difficult to follow this path because if what she likes does 
not act in accordance with her intentions and syllogism then readers will have difficulties 
in understanding her work. This does not assume that the philosopher wants to 
communicate her ideas more than the poet. She just wants to be as clear and specific as 
possible so that she avoids misunderstandings or misinterpretations of her work which may 
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later put her in position to further justify her arguments. The poet seems to be happy to 
communicate her ideas, but in case they are not very clear in the work this does not seems 
to concern her as much as it is evident from previous artists’ testimonies. This analogy 
suggests that the artist has more independence to avoid expressing her intentions explicitly 
or to be uninterested about doing so because she is not committed to deliver her viewers 
what she exactly intends to explore. Painters do not have to overly explain themselves like 
philosophers.  
In the realm of art history there have been many artists who were consciously not 
concerned about how their work would be understood or whether it would be understood 
according to their intentions. For example, for the abstract expressionists, explanation, 
analysis or interpretation of the image represented in the painting was ‘none of the artist’s 
business: his only obligation was to project the ‘significant images’ (Read 1991, p. 263). 
Abstract expressionists believed that the task of the artist was to produce a painting which 
had a life of its own and was independent from its maker. These instances highlight the 
fact that those artists were not (always) concerned with making pictures whose meaning 
would be apparent to the viewers, it seems that their utmost concern was to first make a 
picture for themselves and then for the others. Along the same lines, Frank Stella stated 
that his work does not need further justification, it simply exists – ‘it is just there’ – and the 
viewer perceives the painting only on the basis of what is there, without searching for any 
other kind of meaning (Read 1991, p. 294). His statement does not prompt viewers to 
further search for meanings other the ones in the representation itself. This hints at the fact 
that his making process is done in his way unbiased from the fact that his work might be 
difficult to be perceived by viewers. 
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The above remarks about some of the artist’s states, actions and attitude toward the making 
of her work are rehearsed to help understand that the artist is not always interested in 
making her intentions apparent and that in fact it is difficult for the viewer to discern some 
of her intentions based only on their appearance. This will be analyzed in the following 
sections after an examination of the identification of intentions. After this speculation 
about what an artist does then we move on to examine how the viewer reaches artistic 
intentions and how intentions are made apparent in painting.  
II.  
How does the viewer grasp intention and to what extend are artist’s intentions 
manifest in painting?  
The MAI line of art interpretation in attempting to answer the question of how do we 
identify artist’s intentions seems to state that firstly we can know them by reading the text, 
in the case of literature, since it is the author who tells the story and decides what happens 
in it.
13
 Secondly, it claims that an interpreter can use supportive sources like artist’s diaries, 
interviews, biography and so on which can help illuminate artistic intentions. Therefore, a 
viewer within MAI assumes that in painting she can reach artist’s intentions by looking at 
it as intentions are made apparent in it by the artist who decides about the painting’s 
representation and by getting acquainted with supportive sources. To examine the question 
to what degree the viewer can grasp the artist’s intentions based on their appearance in 
painting we will firstly consider Anscombe’s attitude about how it is possible to 
understand an agent’s intentions and then we will explore how the viewer reaches the 
artist’s intention by reflecting on some examples of painting which aim to illuminate the 
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 Here, we use an example from literature to make an analogy with painting because most MAI views are 
maintained within this genre. 
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degree intentions are apparent to the viewer. I use Anscombe’s view here because I suggest 
that MAI method of interpretation is based on such a model. As was proposed in chapter 3 
the interpretation of everyday actions does not function in the same way as the 
interpretation of artistic intentions.  
1. Anscombe: intentions are obvious through intentional action  
Anscombe claims that if we are asked to describe what someone is doing, then we 
commonly offer a list of her intentional actions, which are often evident to us and do not 
need any special verification and that most of the intentional actions we ascribe to someone 
will also provide that person’s intentions (2000, pp. 7-10). This approach puts forward that 
intentions are identifiable through the agent’s actions. That is to say, if we observe that 
someone is watching a film, then it will normally be true of her that she intended to watch 
a film or intends to be watching a film. Specifically, she states:   
“Well, if you want to say at least some true things about a man’s intentions, 
you will have a strong chance of success if you mention what he actually did 
or is doing. For whatever else he may intend, or whatever maybe his 
intentions in doing what he does, the greater number of the things which you 
would say straight off a man did or was doing, will be things he intends” (p. 
8).  
 
From this quote it seems to be clear that an agent’s actions show what she intended or is 
intending to be doing. Therefore, by accepting Anscombe’s view of intentional action (as it 
has been presented in chapter 3, section 2) it entails our being able to infer what someone 
has intended based on her behavior and on what she has acted upon.  
 
Additionally, she claims that actions can be intentional under one description but not under 
another (p. 29). For example, to determine that a physical movement is intentional is to 
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determine that the specific physical movement satisfies a certain description. This raises 
the question ‘When is a description of an action intentional’? Sometimes it can be the case 
that there are various descriptions of an action and one action described in many ways (pp. 
45-47). For instance, let’s think of an artist who paints green dots on the canvas. It is 
possible that the following descriptions relate to her action: ‘she is using green’, ‘she is 
painting dots’, ‘she is using a lot of thinner’, ‘she is making the canvas deteriorate’, ‘she is 
undertaking a project for a class’. All these descriptions can be true and can describe her 
action, but the question remains ‘under which of all these descriptions is her action 
intentional?’ According to Anscombe’s criteria it can be conceded that a description of the 
artist’s action is intentional if a) she has non-observational knowledge and b) if the 
question ‘why’ has application to her action by being so described. The action is 
intentional under the first description but not under the second. That is because if she is 
asked ‘why are you making the canvas deteriorate?’ and she replies ‘I was not aware I was 
doing that’ (because of the use of a lot of thinner) then the question ‘why’ refuses 
application.  
 
Anscombe asserts that the above example does not involve many actions but one action 
under many descriptions. Thus, according to this syllogism, the artist executes one action 
that can be described as ‘she is painting dots’ or ‘she is using green’ and it is plausible to 
say that she has one intention by executing four or five acts which correspond to many 
descriptions. At this point it may seem likely to say that her intention in painting is to use 
green, paint dots and to submit the painting to her class. One difficulty that arises here is 
that it can also be the case that the artist intended to paint this work to later participate in a 
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competition. Anscombe cites that when there are cases like this then the application of 
further description can be explained by ‘wider circumstances’ that are outside her action. 
That is, by painting green dots counts as participating to a competition. Anscombe’s 
account appears to encompass a variety of actions under one action and it is not exactly 
specified which of these actions are truly intentional and which are accidental. For 
example, she would categorize the action of the deterioration of the canvas under the same 
description of painting green dots while the deterioration is not intentional, it is rather the 
result of using a lot of thinner. At this point it seems hard to define or know what falls 
under the class of ‘wider circumstances’ and therefore it seems possible to suggest that 
sometimes an intention can be interior and the artist’s actions do not always reveal her true 
intentions. What this view amounts to is that Anscombe seems to suggest that intentions 
can be identified through action; based on this view and on MAI, the artist’s intentions are 
accessible through her actions that are apparent in the painting. The example of appearance 
below will elucidate the claim in more detail.  
2. Detectability of intentions in painting 
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, when artists make painting sometimes they 
have intentions and sometimes they do not intend something specific or they get involved 
in making art without being fully consciously. Two positions are held in this section: (1) 
sometimes intentions are easily detected by the viewer and (2) it is sometimes difficult to 
say the artist’s intentions by just looking. Position (1) will not be discussed because such 
cases do not constitute difficulties for MAI; I will only focus on position (2). I propose that 
even when artists have conscious intentions (or experience other states mentioned above 
like inspiration and desire) it is still sometimes hard to access them. Intentions are part of 
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the artist’s mind and despite the fact that sometimes they are clear to her, there are cases 
where they are not apparent or detectable in the work. Here, it is argued that what a 
painting shows may not necessarily be what the artist intends to show. It may be the case 
that what is not shown is what the artist intends, therefore, her actions in the painting 
(through the form of representation) do not necessarily or always show her intentions. In 
MAI context, Carroll claims:  
Biographical data, in other words, can play a role in hypothesizing the 
artist’s intention, while the recognition of the artist’s intention, in turn, 
constrains the kinds of satisfactions, and, correspondingly, the kinds of 
interpretations we may advance in respect to artworks. Not only is 
authorial intention derivable from artworks; authorial intention – and 
biographical information – are relevant to the realization of the aims, 
particularly the conversational aims, we bring to artworks (2004 p. 288).  
 
The idea behind this is constituted by the following possible instances, which are centred 
on the notion of absence, and assumes that is difficult to describe the conscious absence of 
certain intentions based on the representation of painting. For instance, it is possible for an 
artist to intend to paint the absence of a lily by painting a tulip in which case only the tulip 
is apparent while the absence of a lily is what constitutes the artist’s intention. Or let us say 
a painting contains blue, black and white. In such a case, the artist consciously intends not 
to use red and yellow. Despite her fully conscious intention not to use red and yellow, this 
intention is not apparent in the painting despite the fact that the work does not contain red 
and yellow (neither does it contain green, orange, purple and so on). Having looked at this 
painting a viewer can easily assume, based on the MAI framework, that the artist’s 
intention is to only use blue, black and white, since this is what is apparent through the 
representation of the painting. It would be less likely for the viewer to assume that the 
artist’s intention was specifically to not use red and yellow (as there are other colours like 
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pink, grey, brown and so on). Within MAI, presence and appearance of elements is what 
shows intentions, not their absence. According to this scheme, the viewer looks at the 
painting and according to what it represents she makes conjectures about the artist’s 
intentions. As we have seen, this might not always be the case, and as a result the viewer 
may make conjectures about intentions that have not taken place. Those are part of the 
artist’s mind and might not result in any action, or the action in the painting might not 
reveal the intention. Hence, it is somehow innocuous not to (appropriately) rely on the 
artist’s intentions because the representation allegedly shows them. This suggestion does 
not deny that reliable judgments about artist’s intentions are possible to make, since I 
endorse that position (1) is possible, rather it implies that since it is hard to sometimes 
discern the artist’s intentions then these should not constitute the foundation of 
interpretation.  
 
It has to be accepted that there are cases like the above where some of the artist’s 
intentions are never shown in the work and so do not determine the work’s meanings. 
Therefore, sometimes for a viewer to know what the artist’s intentions are and that they are 
apparent in the work she has to associate them with what the artist herself has said in 
statements or diaries, or subordinate them with a critic’s conclusion based on some source 
derived from the artist. In the context of MAI Carroll argues that:  
“Interpretations of artworks should be constrained by our knowledge of 
the biography of the historical artist and our best hypotheses about the 
artist’s actual intentions concerning the artworks in question. Thus, I 
maintain that authorial intentions and biographies are relevant to the 
interpretation of artworks” (1997 p. 305). 
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According to the above assertion, through supportive sources, the viewer can find out 
whether or not the artist’s intentions are truly apparent in the work. In a way she has to find 
out whether there is a correspondence between what is shown on the work and what is 
spelt out in sources like statements, diaries, notes, letters and so on. This suggests that the 
viewer has to do something more than just look at the work. In order to really know that 
intentions are the ones that are represented in the work she has to ‘check’ in a sense with 
another source to confirm if those are true and eventually if they are apparent in the work. 
Without such resources, it is sometimes difficult to know whether or not intentions are 
actually embodied in the work by just being reliant on the appearance of the work. This 
implies that intentions might not always be apparent by their own in painting so the viewer 
has to do further reading or research outside the work in order to identify them. MA 
intentionalists claim that artist’s intentions are apparent in the work, or they should be, and 
because of that the viewer can identify them and thus interpret the work accordingly. This 
leads to the conclusion that if MA intentionalists believe that intentions are apparent 
through the representation of the work then recourse to complementary sources seems to 
be contradictory. 
 
The second reason for challenging the MAI view that intentions are apparent in the work is 
centred on the conception of the artist’s desire to paint and to paint for pleasure and as a 
result on the conception of automatism. It is quite likely that these states undermine the 
position that a painting’s representation shows the artist’s actions and intentions. In view of 
these states, the notion of the appearance of artist’s intention seems to be doubtful, at least 
in the kind of the example discussed above. Those states that have been analysed in the 
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previous chapter in order to give a glimpse into the artist’s states when she paints are used 
here to propose that since painting is sometimes executed for the artist’s desire to paint and 
to paint for pleasure, such states (conceived of as intentions) are difficult to discern in the 
painting’s representation itself. It is hard to see how the intention to feel pleasure can 
plausibly be counted as part of the meaning of the work since it is not apparent. For the 
artist it is meaningful because she has experienced this in a certain way, but it might not be 
meaningful for the viewer since she cannot detect this in the work. The viewer looks at the 
finished work and thus the absence of the pleasure of process which counts as meaning and 
intention for the artist, may not count so for the viewer as she has no means of discerning 
such a pleasure through the representation of the work.  
I do not claim that the viewer can never spot or understand the artist’s intentions or that 
those intentions can never be apparent in painting because intentions are wholly private. I 
rather suggest that sometimes it is hard to grasp the artist’s true intentions only by looking 
at the painting and by other surrounding documents. This does not imply that the artist’s 
mental states are unique to her and that she only can have them as the solipsist does. It 
means that sometimes intentions – which cover a broad range of states as proposed 
throughout – are difficult for the viewer to access only through the representation of 
painting and sometimes by supportive sources. The ways a viewer can grasp painting in 
cases like that is discussed in the following chapter.  
3. The artist’s success and the value of painting 
Here, I will discuss to what degree the artist’s intentions are apparent to the viewer by 
using an example from literature as an analogy for painting. In this section I criticize EAI, 
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some MA intentionalists. This involves a case where some part of the audience deliberately 
– while knowing the author’s stated intentions – decides not to accept them and therefore 
have a different interpretation of the work. Through this discussion I will suggest that in 
cases where intentions are not apparent, that works are still valuable and interpretable.  
Nikos Kazantzakis’s novel The Last Temptation has produced highly controversial and 
divergent interpretations among readers. It has been characterized as godless, immoral and 
offensive by some sections of the public, even when Kazantzakis himself has said that he 
means the very opposite of what his opponents claim. The public’s judgment of immorality 
is incompatible with the author’s stated intentions and disagrees about the basic content of 
the work and for that reason disagrees about the morality. His account was that his work is 
engaged with metaphysical and existential concerns and that by no means did he intend the 
novel to be immoral or to offend religion. His own statement was: “You gave me a curse 
… I give you a blessing: may your conscience be as clear as mine and may you be as moral 
and religious as I” (Bald 2006, p. 180).  Through this case it seems that sometimes even the 
statement of the artist itself is ignored by the audience and that the author’s role in the 
understanding of such works becomes less relevant for the audience who has a different 
interpretation. In cases like this the artist gives an explicit statement (the true intentions) 
which is ignored by the audience who favour their own interpretation. While EAI supports 
the logical equivalence of artistic intentions with a text’s meaning, this example seems to 
create a difficulty for EAI since the author’s formal statement for his work is consciously 
ignored by the public. This seems to disagree with Hirsch’s view. According to him, the 
meaning of a text “is, and can be, nothing other than the author’s meaning” (p. 216) and 
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the meaning of a text is “determined once and for all by the character of the speaker’s 
intention” (1967 p. 219).   
This also conflicts with the following statements made by Iseminger:  
“If exactly one of two interpretive statements about a poem, each of 
which is compatible with its text, is true, then the true one is the one that 
applies to the meaning intended by the author” (1996 p. 320). 
and 
“The next question is in what mode those intentions would play that role, 
if they played it at all, and the alternatives under consideration (and, so far 
as I can see, the only live options) are that the relevant intentions are the 
speaker’s actual intentions or those most reasonably attributed to the 
speaker” (p. 324).  
 
The quotations by Hirsch and Iseminger, Hirsch being EA intentionalist and Iseminger MA 
intentionalist, seem to converge to some degree since both claim that the author’s 
intentions entail the true meaning of a text. This points toward the following considerations 
about the artist’s success and the value of painting. The first crucial question that arises is: 
does this part of the audience who does not adopt the author’s intentions have a 
nonsensical or meaningless interpretation of the work? As we will see in chapter 5 there 
are alternative ways to receive a work in cases like this. The second issue is that through 
the above statements it is implied that in some cases when an artist’s intentions are not 
apparent in the work that the artist is unsuccessful in realizing them and thus her statement 
does not give ground to the viewer for meaningful interpretation. For Hirsch and 
Iseminger, it appears that the artist has to be successful in representing her intentions in her 
work, as the work is going to be the means through which intentions are made apparent. It 
is implied by their claims that cases of unsuccessful completion of intentions entails that 
72 
 
 
viewers’ interpretations are non-appropriate because they do not comply with the artist’s 
intentions since those are not achieved and therefore are not part of the work. This is true 
for EAI but it also seems to be true in Iseminger’s version of MAI since he says that in the 
case when there are two compatible true interpretations of a work, then the true one is the 
one intended by the artist, implying that the other one is in a way less true because it is not 
informed by the artist’s successful intentions. This position seems to sometimes obligate 
the artist to success or failure depending on whether or not her intentions are fulfilled in the 
painting (like in the example of Kazantzakis). There are other ranges of cases of MAI 
where this example would not appear as a difficulty, but in this version of Iseminger I 
think it does.  
This approach leads us to the assumption that EAI and this version of MAI run the risk of 
devaluing both the artist and work since according to it intentions have to be apparent in it 
in order for the viewer to grasp them and failure to grasp them leads to a non-appropriate 
interpretation. Knowing the artist’s intention and evaluating on these grounds whether an 
interpretation is appropriate or non-appropriate, and based on this, evaluating whether an 
artist is successful or not in representing her intentions, can be a parochial position to hold. 
On reflection, it seems that especially EAI and to a less degree MAI reduce art making 
simply to a practice of transferring intentions and interpretation in this context ultimately 
measures the ‘success’ of an artist in the (limited) terms of the execution of her intentions. 
This raises two further important questions: (a) Is art making only a process of executing 
intentions and (b) What if the artist fulfills her intentions and is satisfied by her work and 
her intentions are apparent to her but not to the viewers? In other words, why should a 
work be valuable if the artist’s intentions are not detectable or visible in it? The first 
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question has been discussed in chapter 3 where we examined some states the artist 
undergoes while painting. Below we are concerned with the second question. 
 
If we accept the view that when intentions are not apparent in the work that the artist has 
been unsuccessful in realizing her intentions – and thus viewers cannot understand it – it 
looks as if we assert that such a painting has no value. At this point I will be referring to 
semantic intentions since those can fail or cannot always be easily detected by contrast to 
categorical intentions which rarely seem to fail.
14
 Let us approach the issue by bearing in 
mind the following possibilities: (a) Kazantzakis failed to execute his intentions in the eyes 
of the readers and thus readers interpret the work differently (or according to EAI and this 
version of MAI non-appropriately) and (b) he succeeded in executing his intentions 
according to his own criteria. Either of these two possibilities has led to the creation of that 
text. If we consider the first case in the EAI and this version of MAI then the work’s value 
is questioned because intentions are not apparent and thus the artist has failed to 
successfully express them. The second question has no application since intentions are not 
identified by readers but regarding MAI this brings the following concern. It is an 
important issue to examine as it will help approach the question in play: ‘What if the artist 
fulfills her intentions and is satisfied by her work and her intentions are apparent to her but 
not to the viewers?’  
 
Let us assume that Kazantzakis really failed to make his intentions apparent to the readers. 
This does not discredit the fact that to himself his intentions have been fulfilled and that the 
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 Later in this section I will refer to a case where categorical intentions are not clear.  
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work is valuable for him. We have no substantial grounds to claim that the work is of no 
value either for him or viewers (the criteria for what constitutes a valuable work are 
difficult to be defined).
15
 For Kazantzakis, his work seems to be valuable because through 
it, as he stated, he has explored metaphysical and existential concepts. Thus, to himself he 
represented what he wished. This assumes that what the artist thinks or wishes to 
communicate when she produces her work, if anything, and whatever her mental state is, 
might not be evident in the work in the way she intends. This echoes the previous 
discussion of inspiration, desire and experimentation, intentions, states and actions which 
are inexorably related to the creation of a work but which most of the times are not 
apparent in the finished work. Despite that, they are part of the work and they count as 
meaningful to the artist. This in itself makes the work valuable at least for Kazantzakis. If 
in the process of writing his novel and at the end of writing it he felt that he understood 
what he wished to explore then his work is valuable for him. The fact that an audience 
interprets a work that is not with accordance to his intentions does not render him as failed 
or unsuccessful in accomplishing what he intended. I argue that the artist need have no 
commitment toward the viewer to manifest her intentions – sometimes she does so 
consciously or unconsciously, but that does not seem to constitute a necessary condition 
for the making of a work as we have seen from various artists’ accounts in the previous 
chapter. Intentions that are not apparent in the work or intentions that have failed to be 
fulfilled can still be of value to the artist. That is based on the premise that art making is 
the product of someone’s mind, someone’s reason and it takes place through a process 
which is practically experienced by her in special ways. The contention is that when 
artist’s intentions are not apparent in the work still the work is of value to her because of 
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the process of making; it is true that the process is part of the work for the artist and it is 
hard to deny this. This, on the other hand, is an external fact for the viewer, therefore, for 
her, the process is not valuable in the same way as it is for the artist; still she can 
experience the work in other ways and find some (or all) semantic meanings or relate it to 
the aesthetic as it will be discussed in the following chapter. This suggests that when 
intentions like these or like Kazantankis’ are not apparent in the work, the work is still 
valuable and there to be interpreted in other ways than the ones the artist experienced. 
An example that highlights the fact that works still have value even in the case when there 
is nothing that shows the artist’s intentions is cave painting. In this example I refer to 
categorical intentions. Interpretation of cave painting has been a puzzling issue for critics. 
Critics assert that we are uncertain about what these paintings mean and why they were 
painted. Various interpretations say they were painted for religious or spiritual reasons, for 
magic or for communicating with others. We do not really know the intentions behind it 
for we do not have any written records that explain or describe them. All we have is 
representation (no exact date, name of maker or title). I think the difficulty with their 
‘identity’ – what are they, what kind of art – is because we do not know their categorical 
intentions. They are of course two-dimensional and therefore can be perceived as drawings 
or paintings, but we not specifically know their purpose. They could be representations that 
should be perceived as otherwise, like graffiti, street art or some kind of primitive graphic 
design. In such a case it would sound one-sided to claim that since we do not have written 
records and information about them and their maker, that we cannot interpret them at all or 
that interpretation is non-appropriate and that the assumptions we make about their 
meaning are false. There is a distinction between not knowing what the paintings are for – 
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their purpose – and not being able to respond to the potential for understanding or pleasure 
they afford. It is true that we do not know what purpose they served for, but at the same 
time they are real objects in the world and thus they can be contingently interpreted and 
understood either meaningfully or in terms of the pleasure they afford.  
 
Conclusion 
The plausible actions on the part of the artist and the plausible interpretations of the viewer 
are rehearsed above in order to show that it is hard for the viewer to access the artist’s 
intentions and interpret painting based on the premise that they are apparent. Painting 
might put forward a revelation about the world; it shows a part of reality. The 
understanding of this revelation is a task that the viewer has to undertake sometimes 
without the help (the intentions) of the artist.  The painter for instance, in the first place, 
may not find meaning in the picture she represents but in the thing itself; she has a thought 
of an object to depict that precedes her painting. She may not care about the final 
representation or the meaning the painting will have for the viewer. She might be 
interested in the thing she decides to analyse through the making of the work. She may 
need to understand what she depicts and so she (re)-creates its picture; drawing not only on 
the directly visible world but also on the world of her imagination. When she creates, 
besides attaining the goal of representation, she has other intentions that matter to her, such 
as reaching a state of euphoria, completion, pain, the mastery and understanding of herself 
and of the world. These states are difficult for the viewer to access by just looking at the 
work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Knowing an artist’s intentions and understanding painting  
This chapter is concerned with the examination of the issue whether knowledge of an 
artist’s intentions entails understanding of painting. The crucial worry is revolved around 
the question: is interpretation a correspondence between what the artist intends and what 
the viewer understands? The following arguments as a whole propose that knowledge of 
the artist’s intentions is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the understanding 
of painting. That is, understanding painting is different from understanding what the artist 
intends – understanding the artist’s intentions and understanding a painting can comprise 
two different situations. The chapter consists of three sections which aim to show that 
artist’s intentions – for gaining understanding of that which she wishes to understand 
through the making of her work – do not always result in a useful understanding on the 
part of the viewer. The first section examines Gericault’s intentions in the Raft of the 
Medusa and to what extent they constitute valuable ground for the viewer’s understanding 
of the painting, through an analysis of the nature of medium and its use by the artist. The 
second section explores the contention that MAI seems to promote a special kind of viewer 
in a special kind of situation when it comes to interpreting painting. The third section 
eventually endorses an approach which expounds that interpreting painting should involve 
a valuable understanding that is relative to the viewer.  
 
1. Understanding Gericault’s intentions in The Raft of the Medusa  
As it has been previously mentioned, actual intentionalists claim that in order for the 
viewer to have a correct interpretation of a work she has to be aware of the artist’s 
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intentions. The argument of this section firstly suggests that the viewer may be aware of 
the artist’s intentions, based on these intentions know what the painting is about, yet not 
understand it. In an attempt to approach this issue we will take as an example Gericault’s 
painting The Raft of the Medusa
16
 which will be used in order to elucidate the following 
questions: what is it to know Gericault’s intentions in The Raft of the Medusa and what is it 
to understand it? I aim to show that the viewer does not need to understand Gericault’s 
intentions to understand his painting. 
(i) What is it to know Gericault’s intentions in The Raft of the Medusa?  
Reading the title of the painting and other sources that provide information relevant to the 
painting eventually lead the viewer to know that the painting is about a raft with survivors 
of the wreck of a French naval frigate in 1816 (Janson & Janson 1997, pp. 676-677). On a 
first level, this enables the viewer to assume that having read that the painting is about this 
specific raft, and since the painting actually represents a raft, that she knows Gericault’s 
intentions.17 Moreover, knowledge of Gericault’s intentions can involve a search of his 
diaries and sketchbooks, a reading of his biography and criticism about the painting, an 
acquaintance with the historical events that took place during the period the painting was 
executed or an examination of the artistic movements of that time. All these provide a 
general surrounding of the painting’s artistic and historic-cultural background which 
facilitates the viewer to create a (postulated) knowledge of Gericault’s intentions. So far, 
                                                          
16
 We will discuss this painting because it falls under the realm of figurative and realistic painting and this 
seems to make viewers think that intentions are more easily discerned than in the case of abstract painting.  
17
 The depiction of this fact might constitute Gericault’s intentions, although one can claim that Gericault’s 
intentions, among other possibilities, might have been to create a very big painting which depicts a public 
event because this would help boost his career; or, to depict something that would ultimately become 
historical so that his name would be remembered after his death; or, he might have intended to depict any 
event that includes many human figures because this might have been fashionable then. This possibility will 
be discussed further later on. 
79 
 
 
this approach to the question of what is it to know the artist’s intentions seems to be 
smoothly accounted for.   
(ii) What is it to understand Gericault’s intentions and therefore to understand the 
painting? 
One can argue that once we know that Gericault intended to depict the raft of the Medusa 
and after getting acquainted with the general surrounding of the painting’s artistic and 
historic-cultural background, we come to the conclusion that we have the substantial 
material to understand the painting. However, I contend below that knowledge of his 
intentions does not justify an understanding as a result. Gericault’s intentions, as described 
just above, let the viewer know about his intentions, that is to say what the painting looks 
like and surrounding documentation. This fact does not essentially commit the viewer to 
understand the painting. Knowing about intentions and all the information they bring with 
them give material to the viewer which can assist to her understanding of the painting, but 
understanding the painting itself concerns a deeper meaningful and emotional state than 
just knowing about the artist’s intentions and what the painting is about. This kind of 
understanding is associated with the idea of synaesthesis discussed in chapter 1.  
 
The discussion of these questions is with a view to doubt MAI that the true meaning of a 
work is the one spelled out by the artist and to suggest that knowledge of the artist’s 
intentions is neither necessary nor sufficient for the interpretation of painting. One 
empirical or physical necessity for understanding a painting is the sense of sight. 
Nevertheless, some conceptual necessities are more difficult to define as we will see later 
on. In relation to this, I will argue that knowledge of the artist’s intentions does not 
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constitute such a necessity. A necessary condition for interpretation is the ability on the 
part of the viewer to perceive at least one part of reality through one or more senses and to 
be aware of the limits of the painting. A sufficient condition may be the ability to 
distinguish between a painting (a work of art) and something else. This will be clarified 
through the following discussion on knowledge of artist’s intentions and understanding of 
her painting.  
 
The issue of what it is to understand the artist’s intentions, and thus the painting, turns out 
to be less straightforward to answer than the first question. One of the difficulties develops 
in this way. For a viewer, to know Gericault’s intentions is to know that he intended to 
depict the raft of the Medusa in the way he did. For a viewer, to understand Gericault’s 
intentions is to understand that which Gericault hoped to come to an understanding of, or 
indeed did come to an understanding of, through the process of making this piece. To 
understand what he intends to understand might not be as easy for the viewer as it is to 
know what he intends. There is a significant difference between (i) reading and being 
aware of what the artist intends and (ii) experiencing and understanding what he intends. It 
seems to me that when MA intentionalists claim that the viewer should know at least some 
of the artist’s intentions in order to have an appropriate understanding of a painting that 
they mean she should eventually understand what the artist intended to understand. This 
conclusion springs from the fact they support an objective understanding – they distance 
themselves from individual understandings – so it appears that they put forward an 
understanding that the artist has intended to understand himself too. As quoted earlier, 
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Iseminger claims that the true – therefore objective – interpretation of a work is the one 
intended by the artist.   
 
To support the claim that to understand painting is different than understanding what the 
artist intends, let’s suppose that Gericault, for instance, intends to understand the survivors’ 
emotional and physical situation – that he wishes to understand their desperation, their 
agonising over what is going to happen next, the fact that they are seriously injured and 
starving. To achieve this, he creates a picture of it aiming to reach an understanding of this 
kind of situation. In doing this, he uses actual substance to examine and/or reach his 
understanding of the survivors’ emotional and physical situation. Consequently, through 
the process of dealing with oil paint he comes to understand something about that situation. 
This is his tool which will lead him to understand that which he intends to depict.  
 
The viewer, however, understands the painting through other means and lacks Gericault’s 
use of the medium. She arrives at her understanding through her visual abilities and 
experience – she does not have the experience of the medium that Gericault has. The 
difference in the means that Gericault and the viewer use in order to understand the 
survivor’s situation should not be simply neglected. The inaccessibility of the use of the 
medium on the part of the viewer entails that the artist’s experience of understanding his 
intentions is different than that of the viewer. For in dealing with paint Gericault masters, 
practices, experiments with materials and techniques and experiences the medium in a very 
different way to the viewer when she looks at the work. While painting, he experiences 
understanding through trying to depict this situation, through painting figures, erasing and 
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re-painting, using pigments and colours in specific ways and techniques, through having a 
certain degree of expectancy of how his painting will reveal, through feeling pleasure and 
enjoyment or dissatisfaction at some points, by physical labour and time, in order to reach 
what he believes is enough for his depiction (and thus his understanding). Through this he 
experiences physical, emotional and meaningful understanding of the survivors’ situation. 
Gericault may have fulfilled the intentions he set out beforehand and may have also 
understood additional things coincidentally through the process of production. He produces 
his painting and eventually his understanding of the survivors’ situation through his 
medium. Gericault and the viewer share some means of understanding – such as visual 
abilities, space, time, light and so on – but they do not share the use of the medium, its 
practice and experimentation with it. Hence, knowledge of the fact that Gericault intended 
to understand the survivors’ situation is not enough to make a viewer understand this in the 
way that Gericault did. That is because Gericault could have used other means to 
understand the survivors’ situation. For example, he could have undergone a deep 
reflection on the survivors’ situation without producing any work; or he could have used 
stone to make a sculpture of it or he could have written a poem or compose a piece of 
music. There are many media and ways through which he could have pursued this 
understanding. Even a difference in the choice of the technique or colour palette could 
have brought a different understanding to him. Despite all these choices, he specifically 
chose to undertake his understanding through painting.  
 
This emphasizes the fact that the making of a painting – its medium and use of it – is 
unreservedly essential to the artist’s understanding of what she depicts and as such it can 
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only be experienced by her. To the viewer, the making of a painting has different weight, 
as it can be hard for her to understand the making process (or hypothesize about it) in the 
way the artist does. Understanding painting through the use of medium by the artist is not 
apparent or accessible to the viewer through the representation of the painting. This can 
hardly be available or evident to the viewer even if she tries to theoretically assume it.
18
 
This implies that the experience of making is meaningfully different on the part of the 
artist from the experience of interpreting on the part of the viewer and it is not enough to 
just know about intentions in order to understand painting. This does not imply that the 
viewer cannot understand a painting; the artist and viewer can understand similar things 
but the meaningfulness of the medium is difficult to be passed on to the viewer. 
 
At this point it is worth lingering for a while on the notion of medium and its use by the 
artist in order to support the claim of this section. The medium is all an artist has in order 
to reach her painting. Without a medium there cannot be any work and with various media 
there can be diverse kinds of art. Medium is an intermediary, an in-between the artist and 
the in-virtue painting. Before being practically manipulated and applied, a medium is 
amorphous – it is a bare material in its authentic form. In virtue of skill and application 
techniques it can become something which can give an artist meaning and emotional 
insight and help her understand that which she wishes to understand. There are no limits as 
to what a medium is, as there can be numerous media that can be applied on a two-
dimensional surface.  
                                                          
18 Similarly, when a spectator watches in TV a surfer riding her board on the crest of a wave she understands 
or experiences something about this spectacle. Her understanding though is different than that of the surfer 
since the surfer actually experiences it through her body moves, the use of her board, the measure of the 
wave, like speed, height and so on which affect the way she moves toward the shore. 
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The use of a medium is the method of its application by the artist – a technical and skilful 
process. It is the action taken of the material itself. The use of medium does not constitute 
a plain functional process which will (only) make a representation of intentions come true 
but is in fact a distinctive moment for the artist. It is not a super-mundane episode in the 
artist’s process, but it is a fully potential moment that encapsulates a representation in 
progress that the artist cannot anticipate in advance. As it has been emphasized throughout 
this project, the making of a painting is not a mere transference of intentions on a two-
dimensional surface by the use of a medium. The use of medium concerns a puzzling 
process: to master it, to actually make it produce representations, control it to a certain 
degree and attempt to experience its potentials and curbs involve an exceptional state. It is 
usually a pleasurable experience for the artist, but at the same time it can also be painful 
and include excruciation, unexpectedness, the awaiting of a revelation of a new 
representation. The use of the medium is (the) painting itself for the artist. The course of 
the action or how the action is executed is not always predictable. It is not the finished 
work that she only and foremost expects (for she does not exactly know how it will be and 
what it will reveal) but the process of the making of it too. She yearns for the arcane 
possibilities of making pictures by using pigments in various ways. There is great 
versatility in the use of medium and this in itself encompasses a wonderful process for the 
artist.  
 
To illustrate the point better let us use an analogous example from literature, poetry in 
specific. When a poet intends to write a poem in order to explore the notion of harmony 
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she employs her tool into action, that is, language. In writing her poem she does not know 
the exact words and the final form of the poem until she will have used words in certain 
ways and combinations (the poet does not know what words she will use until she will 
have used them). Language is the medium and words and phrases make up the poem in the 
way she deals with it. A lot of poets may have very similar ideas or intentions about what 
they intend to explore but at the end – despite the fact that they have similar ideas and 
intentions and share the same tool – they do not produce the same poems. A poem as well 
as a painting is formed through the practice of its medium and media take their final form 
after they are actually manipulated in certain ways by the artist. 
 
In support of the above claim, let us use another example like when an artist paints a still 
life and her intentions are to do so in a very realistic way in order to test her skills. The 
viewer looks at the finished painting and through it realizes that the subject is depicted in a 
very realistic way and therefore she is right in partly identifying and knowing the artist’s 
intention. However, the artist’s intention to understand how to paint a still life realistically 
in order to test her skills is not shown in the work despite the fact that the subject is 
realistically painted. The artist’s use of the medium comprises the examination of an object 
through means of observation, pigments, skill, the perception of light, time, space and the 
relation of the object to her, which altogether aim to produce a realistic depiction. That for 
the viewer is difficult to understand. The viewer may recognize, know and understand that 
this is a realistically painted still life, but she cannot understand the artist’s intention to 
understand the performance of realistic depiction of the subject through the medium and 
the process she undertakes. What the artist intends and what she has ultimately understood 
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may remain unknown to the viewer. In addition to the medium, the states an artist 
undergoes while painting, like inspiration, desire and experimentation are accounted as 
part of meaning for her but for the viewer it is difficult to argue that those states count as 
meaning for her.  
 
Going back to Gericault’s example, through the processing of the medium he might have 
understood his intentions (to understand the survivors’ physical and emotional situation) 
and symptomatically might have also understood some of the following: he may have 
realized that he has become more patient than he used to be or that he is successful in 
depicting bodies (or the opposite) or that he does not like this kind of scene despite the fact 
he has depicted it, or that by painting every single bit of the painting he may have realized 
how many forms the human body can take, what colour and what shape bodies can have, 
how many expressions a face can have, how an odor can be depicted, how the odor of oil 
paint and the lighting conditions of his studio may have affected him while painting. Or he 
may have felt contentment, having learned or acquired something, or may have felt 
physical pain by making it. One can say that not all of this is obviously about the use of the 
medium as such, however, they are all unswervingly connected to it. It seems implausible 
to detach the artist from the use of the medium and still to have those experiences. So far, it 
has been advocated that some of the artist’s intentions with respect to the making of her 
painting by the use of the medium do not contribute to the viewer’s understanding.  
 
At this point, it is important to examine whether the viewer’s interpretation is confined to 
addressing some of the artist’s intentions. This directs us to the examination of the notions 
of content and interpretation as well as to the questions what is content and how is it 
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created and how does it differs from interpretation. To begin with, content is the 
representation of objects and formal elements in painting. On the one hand, it has a 
material aspect, so it is the painting’s substance which is created by the formal aspects 
aforementioned and on the other hand it is the final two-dimensional representation as it is 
presented to the viewer; both of these aspects are related to the artist’s intentions. On The 
Raft of the Medusa, obviously there are some elements that are actually there before the 
viewer’s eye: the specific colours, shapes, forms, arrangement of objects and figures, oil 
paint, techniques, use of light etc., (by contrast to the experienced process of making on the 
part of Gericault). For instance, the painting contains a representation of sea, a raft and 
human figures because the artist has intended to paint them and even in the case when she 
painted them unconsciously, these elements are actually there constitute true facts about 
the painting. This fact can be described in this way: ‘in the painting there is sea, a raft and 
human figures’; and to some extent, certain formal aspects can be described too: ‘the 
painting contains black and yellow, it is painted in oils, it has many curves and some 
straight lines and it is 491cm x 416cm’. These elements constitute the painting’s content or 
the content of representation, which is determined by the artist. Therefore, the viewer is 
confined to the contents of representation, in that she cannot claim that there are no figures 
on the painting while there are or that there are green pears while there are not, and is also 
confined to categorical intentions.  
 
The idea behind this is that Gericault determines the content of his painting, what the 
painting represents, and so the viewer is able to recognize that these are the contents of it 
and based on this to interpret the painting. For a viewer, claiming that on the painting she 
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sees a ship instead of a raft this would entail a wrong interpretation since the content of 
representation does not afford such an interpretation. Nonetheless, we should be careful not 
to conclude that the determination of the contents of the painting (being determined by the 
artist), the actual representation, manifestly bounds the viewer to the artist’s intentions and 
hence that the contents allow for an objective interpretation. What the content of 
representation allows for is an objective description of it, but not an objective interpretation 
of it.  
 
This suggests that content (understood as a picture’s formal and representational elements), 
can be more fixed whereas interpretation can be more individualized, experiential and may 
involve parameters like how the work is both emotionally and meaningfully received in 
relation to the viewer. What I claim here is that the content of representation affords more 
as material for interpretation than what the artist determines on the painting, both 
emotionally and meaningfully. As just mentioned above, if the painting contains a 
representation of a raft, one cannot claim that it does not contain it – any claim that there is 
no raft in the painting will therefore be false. But if someone says ‘this painting is very 
smoothly painted’ and someone says ‘this painting depicts the scene so realistically’ then 
both statements can be relatively true to the viewer since judgement about the way the 
contents are depicted might also be part of interpretation. The feeling of pleasure, beauty or 
awe or admiration of the artist’s mastery can be part of interpretation as well. Those 
interpretations do not relate to the semantic intentions of the artist to mean something 
through the contents of representation, they are rather associated with aesthetic 
interpretation which will be discussed in the following chapter. If, after having been told 
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that a painting contains a raft, one were to ask, ‘What is the raft like?’, it would be easy to 
describe: ‘It is brown and square shaped’. By contrast, when someone is told that ‘the 
painting is delicately depicted’ or ‘the painting reminds me of B’ then questions like ‘what 
is it to be delicately depicted?’ or ‘what is it to remind you of B?’ are more difficult to 
answer – there is a degree of vagueness in them which inhibits a universal and objective 
account. That is because even if someone tries to give a definition of ‘what is it to be 
delicately depicted’ in a more generalized and standardized definition (like a dictionary or 
common sense definition), it is yet more difficult to explain ‘what it is to be delicately 
depicted’ in relation to the painting since this is a more confiscated definition than a 
common sense definition.  
 
The difference between the case of the claims ‘the raft is brown and has sort of a square 
shape’ and the case of ‘the painting is delicately depicted’ is that the latter statement makes 
a claim regarding a judgement about the way the content of representation  is depicted 
(whether a viewer takes the painting to be depicted as such or not) and therefore is not part 
of the stable content as the representation of a raft is, because everybody agrees that there 
is a raft that is sort of square in the painting (part of the content of the painting), but maybe 
not everybody agrees that the painting is delicately depicted (part of the interpretation of 
the painting). It is also realistically and elaborately depicted as well but not everybody may 
agree on that. This leads to the claim that interpretation, but not content, might be that 
which is ‘contested’ (based on the content of representation) and that this is one way to 
distinguish between the two.   
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The above discussion establishes that the content of representation in the painting does not 
depend on the viewer and it might be independent and objective of how the viewer sees it. 
Interpretation, on the other hand, depends at least partly on the viewer because in order for 
a representation to be interpreted it is not a prerequisite for the viewer to receive the 
representation as everyone else receives it. A difficulty that arises here is that if we equate 
content with what is there to be interpreted (meaning that both have to be objective on the 
part of the viewer) we seem to ignore that the viewer is an individual entity who owns an 
active body with various emotions, feelings, physiological processes, specific background, 
experiences and particularities. This is the issue of examination of the next section. Such a 
case would entail all viewers reaching the same proper objective interpretation because 
they all have similar backgrounds and experiences. The MA intentionalist seems to equate 
representation with interpretation because she firstly asserts that intentions are apparent in 
the work (through the content of representation) so the viewer can identify them, and 
secondly since she emphasizes a ‘proper objective’ interpretation (true if it is compatible 
with the artist’s intentions). She assumes an objective interpretation that is the same for 
viewers and this implies that viewers stand on the same level. To that end the MA 
intentionalist appears to be monist.  
Critical monism supports the idea that there is ‘a single, comprehensive, true (correct) 
interpretation for each work of art’ (Stecker 1994, p. 193). MAI seems to go along the 
same lines as critical monism as it accepts one interpretation of the work: the one that is 
compatible to the artist’s intentions. The artist might have many intentions and therefore 
many interpretations, but the similarity with critical monism lies in the fact that MAI is 
based on one way of interpreting a work which is objective and right. The difficulty with 
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endorsing this conception of interpretation is further examined below in connection to the 
issue that MAI promotes a special kind of viewer and a special kind of situation when it 
comes to knowledge of the artist’s intentions. This is supported in relation to the issue 
discussed above about the fact that it is not enough to just know the artist’s intentions in 
order to understand a painting, and that the contents of representation afford more 
understandings than only those intended by the artist.  
 
2. Emotional understanding  
By acting in accordance with MAI model, one comes to the conclusion that there is a 
special kind of viewer when it comes to interpretation. This kind of viewer is able to 
recognize the artist’s intentions and understand the painting in the way the artist intended. 
She is also expected to interpret the painting objectively – in a compatible way with artistic 
intention – and hence individualities and emotional particularities on the part of the viewer 
seem to be neglected or to be of secondary importance. This leads us to the following 
concern. The claim for objective meaning disregards individualities and emotional 
particularities which are of paramount significance for the viewer since they are closely 
related to her idiosyncrasy and life, and thus to how she perceives painting. MAI seems to 
defend a process of interpretation where the viewer is detached and unbiased from her state 
of being. In specific, they assert that: 
“Critics who say they want to enjoy the interpretive freedom offered by 
moderate intentionalism still deem it best to rely on information about the 
author’s context and attitudes in establishing the text, in deciding which 
linguistic conventions to adopt in reading the text, and in determining the 
text’s generic and other relations” (Mele & Livingston 1992 p. 945). 
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This quote suggests that while MAI is more liberal in what it allows than EAI it is still 
bound to the regulation of meaning by the artist. This is what leads to the conviction that 
MAI promotes objective meaning. In this section, I highlight the importance of emotional 
understanding without aiming to propose that interpretation is totally subjective and 
arbitrary and wholly depended on the viewer. As is mentioned in the previous section, 
there are true facts about painting like the content of representation which is determined by 
the artist. However, beyond that, there comes emotional understanding; in the context of 
painting interpretation emotional understanding involves the ability of the viewer to 
perceive the atmospheric character and the ineffable exertion of painting. This kind of 
understanding enfolds meaningful understanding but at the same time it compellingly 
encloses emotive responses. This is part of synaesthesis; it suggests that emotion is not 
universally experienced in an objective way and in painting interpretation it can have 
diverse aspects according to the viewer’s idiosyncrasy. It is important to stress at this point 
that any kind of work of art has aesthetic properties, which the interpreter can perceive 
according to her perceptual and aesthetic abilities. By ‘perceptual’ abilities, we mean sense 
faculties such as sight, hearing and touch. By ‘aesthetic’ abilities, we mean emotional 
sensitivity, powers of appreciation, judgement, understanding, taste, knowledge and so on. 
In this section it is claimed that neither what is perceived by individual perceptual abilities 
nor aesthetic abilities can be fully determined by the artist’s intentions. The contention is 
based on the fact that emotions seem to be comprised from experience and viewers do not 
always share the same experiences. According to Goldie:  
“An emotion is a complex state, relatively more enduring than an emotional 
episode, which itself includes various past episodes of emotional experience, 
as well as various sorts of disposition to think, feel, and act, all of which can 
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dynamically interweave and interact. What holds these diverse elements 
together is their being part of a narrative” (2002, p. 11).  
 
That is to say, an emotion is complex since it comprises various elements like bodily 
changes, thoughts, perceptions, feelings, dispositions, consciousness, and experiences. It is 
also episodic and dynamic in the sense that it ‘comes and goes’ and depends on a variety of 
factors related to our dispositions and aspects of our life. Lastly, it is structured because 
our life has a narrative structure; it involves a sequence and unfolding of actions and 
events, feelings and thoughts that are connected from our point of view (pp. 12-13). This 
suggests that viewers’ emotional states involve complex individual situations rather than a 
universal emotional state directed by the artist. Namely, every viewer has her own history 
of events, experiences and characteristics, which affect her emotional encounters with 
painting and this as a result may hinder an objective emotional state intended by the artist.   
 
It can be possible that some emotions can be aroused that the artist did not intend to be 
aroused but which contribute to the viewer’s emotional psychology and pleasure. We may 
look at a specific painting more than once when we feel that we gain certain pleasure from 
it or that it is important for us to look at either to rehearse an emotion and understanding 
gained the last time we looked at it or a more intense one. We look at it in different 
situations and at different times and therefore it is plausible that our interpretation of it 
varies. The specific time of each viewing can provide a different way of experiencing it. 
Namely, the way we look at it can differ at times according to our state of being. For 
instance, when we look at it when we are drunk it might reveal something different to us 
than when we see it after we had a long discussion about Kant’s theory of the sublime or 
just after we had a lecture on how we perceive truth or after something good has happened 
94 
 
 
to us. If we choose to look at the painting while smooth light comes from the window and 
rays of light hit some parts of it while others are really dark this is our conscious choice; 
the painting is still the way it used to be before but we have chosen to look at it under other 
conditions which can change its interpretation. These states are not part of the artist’s 
intentions but do happen and can consciously or unconsciously affect our interpretation in 
many ways. As a result, it is difficult for a viewer to always be in the ideal environment 
and frame of mind in order to understand a painting in the way the artist intended. A 
viewer cannot exclude her own emotional peculiarity and history of experience in order to 
interpret a painting only in agreement to the artist’s intentions. It can be true that viewers 
undergo different emotional reactions when they are under same kinds of circumstances 
because people differ in their emotional sensibilities. To exemplify this, in Picasso’s 
Guernica a viewer who has been through a war or has lost a loved person in war will 
perhaps not interpret the painting in the same way as somebody who did not have the same 
experience. The contents of representation of the painting afford to show the tragedy of 
war because the artist has actually painted it, but the painting itself affords more potential 
revelations in virtue of each viewer’s emotional particularities. This is what synaesthesis is 
about; beyond the fact that Picasso represented the tragedy of war and the viewer can 
understand that, there is something deeper that different individuals will experience 
according to their experience. It is something special beyond the artist’s control that alerts 
the viewer to connect the painting with her idiosyncrasy. Synaesthesis on a first level joins 
understanding of the content of representation and on a second level awakens aesthetic and 
emotional understanding which directs to a special kind of awareness which the artist 
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might have not intended, since this kind of understanding is also influenced and informed 
by the viewer’s experience.  
 
This suggests that knowledge of the artist’s intentions may not always enhance viewers’ 
understanding in the same way, which recalls the initial claim of this chapter that the 
viewer does not essentially experience the same understanding as the artist. Let us consider 
for example, Rembrandt’s The Rich Man from the Parable.19 This painting depicts a rich 
man surrounded by books, papers and some coins and it alludes to Christ’s parable about 
the foolishness of attributing riches too much importance. Knowledge of intentions in this 
case entails knowledge of the parable and thus this painting falls under religious painting in 
a way. According to MAI position, Rembrandt’s plausible intentions were to depict the 
rich man from the parable and hence to understand something by painting it 
(hypothetically to understand something himself or to represent to viewers this scene in 
order to stimulate an understanding of the parable). Rembrandt actually represented a rich 
man, and by this action he may have understood what he wished or intended; despite that, 
this does not entail the same understanding to viewers. My view is that this painting 
affords much more – especially with regard to emotional understanding – than what 
Rembrandt might have intended. Here, it is argued that knowledge of what Rembrandt 
means may not ensure or enhance the viewer’s understanding of the painting. The title 
refers to the rich man (which is the way we come to know that this is the man from the 
parable) but the painting itself does not unquestionably represent this (Rembrandt does not 
actually represent a story about the parable of the rich man). In effect, it seems that the 
emotional vitality of the painting outweighs the meaning of the parable. The magnificent 
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 Table of Pictures, Figure 2. 
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portrayal of light, the way it touches the surface of objects, the warmth it creates and the 
sensational energy it emits make a stronger case than the instructive interpretation of the 
parable. In fact, the parable is almost unnoticeable because of the abundance of the 
emotional dynamism that penetrates the painting. It seems that the parable itself is not 
emphasized as much as the sensual use of colours and light. For this reason, the viewer is 
not forcefully involved with the meaning of the parable itself – as actual intentionalists 
would assume – but is more captivated by the painting’s emotional aspects. The viewer can 
use this emotional and meaningful affordance in order to valuably relate the painting to 
her.20 This leads us to the following section.  
 
3. Appropriate and non-appropriate interpretation  
Further to the claim that painting enfolds emotional understanding which might not always 
be part of the artist’s intentions, this section holds that knowledge of artistic intentions 
being taken as the standard of appropriateness of meaning can neglect the fact that painting 
affords more than what an artist intends and the viewer is held back from finding more 
meanings and understandings in it, which may be of value in relation to her. The difference 
of the contention here from the one expounded in the previous section is that 
interpretations which have value for the viewer can be accepted even when she fails to 
identify the true artist’s intention and thus when her interpretation is non-appropriate 
within the MA intentionalist context.  
 
                                                          
20
 We should note here that the viewer can always search for the artist’s intentions, not in an imperative sort 
of way (because she wants to identify the objective meaning that intentionalism proposes), but because she 
chooses to do so for enhancing meaningful understanding of the parable. 
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Here, I support a kind of valuable approach to interpretation. Namely, a non-appropriate 
interpretation can be valuable for a viewer. Viewer’s interpretation does not inescapably 
have to do with the factual nature of the representational content of the painting (to do with 
how elements are actually in the painting, reflecting the artist's compositional choices) 
rather it can be related to her experience, resulting in an understanding that is valuable to 
her. At this point it is essential to explain what is meant by valuable understanding. This is 
a kind of understanding within the synaesthesis context which helps self-awareness, an 
understanding that does not essentially have to do with how people in general understand 
painting objectively, but with how we build our understanding through our idiosyncrasy 
and experience, about something that is valuable to us but might not be valuable to others. 
This aims to emphasize that we may not be able to understand the The Raft of the Medusa 
as Gericault intended because we may not have the kind of disposition he had. The value 
approach to interpretation can be relativist because the relevant sort of value varies from 
viewer to viewer. When a specific interpretation is valuable for a viewer but not valuable 
for another, then it is true relative to the first viewer but not true to the second. In this 
context an interpretation can prove to be useful for a viewer, but still be non-appropriate 
according to MAI. To my view, interpretation should endorse a pluralist approach. Critical 
pluralism contends that there are many acceptable interpretations that do not amount to a 
single, correct interpretation (Stecker 1994 p. 193). For this reason, I suggest that it is 
differences in understanding, not merely the recognition or knowledge of what the depicted 
object is about – and thus only true correspondence to artist’s intentions – that can make 
interpretation fruitful.  
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Let’s speculate how different viewers with different backgrounds would valuably respond 
to The Raft of the Medusa. An engineer could see it as an examination of the raft’s 
structures, a physicist as an investigation of how light works, a psychologist as a 
representation of how human conditions develop in such situations, a fisherman as to how 
the sea reacts. In each case the viewer perceives the painting in different valuable ways 
which are governed by her background, her potentials and her general disposition of mind 
and body. Each of this interpretations can be valuable to the viewer depending to the extent 
they enhance her understanding. While MAI can be conceived in some cases to offer a 
pluralistic attitude, the ranges of sources a viewer can use to reach several interpretations 
spring only from artistic sources.  
“Sometimes the author’s semantic intentions are less limited than the 
meanings a reader may be able to dream up on the basis of the text and 
other background evidence. Sometimes interviews and diaries open up all 
sorts of wonderful undiscovered meanings” (Livingston 1998 p. 844).  
This assumes that when interpretations are many and different they are still bound within 
the artist’s context. While MAI accepts that artistic intentions are occasionally less limited 
than what a reader can imagine, it refers to ‘wonderful undiscovered meanings’ which 
derive from artistic interviews and diaries. It does not offer other ways for interpretability 
like speculating on the painting’s value in relation to the viewer. For instance, if we are to 
examine the question ‘What is the relation of interpretation to the painting?’ and ‘How 
does the painting arrive at interpretation?’ perhaps we would reply that the relation and 
arrival in question are established by the viewer. The artist who is the maker of 
representation can only partly establish what an interpretation affords; if not at least partly 
established by the viewer then we are lead to the question of what would be the ontological 
importance of interpretation, why would it be undertaken in the first place by other people 
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other the maker herself. It should be highlighted that for the artist the making of the 
representation is practiced by her, solely by her as discussed previously; however, 
interpretation is not solely practiced by her so there should be a share to the viewer to 
practice interpretation which is informed by her experience and disposition and as to how 
valuable it is for her. This proposes that the viewer’s idiosyncratic involvement is vital.  
 
This leads to a further question: ‘Why do we perform interpretation?’ I would say we do so 
because we want to make sense of painting in relation to us, because it helps us understand 
something that is valuable to us. If it simply offers us an understanding that someone else 
had which does not make us react in a valuable way then it is difficult to claim that 
interpretation is valuable in the first place. For a viewer to value a painting implies a 
special kind of understanding which is different from the understanding she gains from 
other situations or objects of the world. Understanding a painting in relation to the viewer 
can be the value itself of the presence of a painting to the viewer and it is difficult to argue 
that such a concept of value is universally and objectively perceived. 
Before proceeding to explaining the above contention, we should note that the viewer 
draws on several sources of knowledge when contemplating a painting. As previously 
stated, these will include reading criticism, reading about the artist’s intentions, the cultural 
background of the work, time, place, title and so on. Other sources may be individually 
particular, like for example our background, experience, insight, our senses and perceptive 
abilities, faculties of recognition and sensitivity. From a phenomenological standpoint we 
could say that at least to some degree we understand painting through our experience and 
intuition. Intuition is a special faculty of perception which brings knowledge and intuitions 
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and can be thought of “as theoretical hunches of a sort; that is unrefined, relatively 
spontaneous beliefs that something is (or is not) the case” (Moser, Mulder & Trout 1998, 
p.111). A statement of an intuition does not meet any significant standard of evidence or 
appropriateness. It is typically expressed in a casual observation based on views about 
something being plausible or implausible and cannot be justified as true or not on the MA 
intentionalist grounds. Yet, it can be profitable for the viewer.  
 
To defend the claim that knowledge of the artist’s intention might not provide a valuable 
understanding and that it may afford more than he intended, we will ponder on the 
following instance. It has been reported that Gericault chose to produce The Raft of the 
Medusa because he wished to attract public interest (an ambitiously big painting which 
concerned a political theme of the time and which was not commissioned). This is claimed 
to have been at least one of his intentions.
21
 If this was indeed his primary intention then 
one can contend that this information is not valuable to the viewer with regard to 
understanding the work and furthermore that it is not apparent in it. This information might 
not be of value since by knowing that Gericault’s main intention was to concern himself 
with depicting a current political issue because he was ambitious and wished to attract 
public interest, this in itself is a superficial kind of understanding, and therefore not 
valuable (despite its being valuable for Gericault). To know this intention neither 
contributes to a meaningful nor an emotional understanding of the painting. This only 
appraises information that in itself is interpretationally insignificant. By this, I argue that 
there must be something deeper to meaningfully and emotionally understand through the 
painting. For example, the large size of it may contribute to its aesthetic value as perceived 
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 http://www.louvre.fr/llv/activite/liste_parcours.jsp?bmLocale=en 
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by the viewer even though Gericault’s intention regarding the size was to gain public 
attention (and not to cause certain aesthetic feelings). For that reason, knowledge of the 
artist’s intentions in such situations does not provide any constructive ground for a 
valuable understanding. A worthy route to reaching an understanding of the work in this 
case is for the viewer to seek other meanings that are valuable to her by relating the work 
to her experience. This process is approached as follows.  
 
Focus on the artist’s intentions may, in turn, lead to an excessive focus on knowledge 
about specific things (such as the fact that this painting represents a raft and that it is made 
to gain public attention) as opposed to the understanding of something in/through the work 
which valuably relates to the viewer’s experience. Concentration on this kind of 
knowledge can have either positive or negative results for her. A positive result can be that 
it gives the viewer a glimpse into what the work is about and therefore may help her 
understand it by trying to understand the artist’s intentions. A negative result might be the 
one just mentioned above (where knowledge of the fact that Gericault wished to produce a 
very big painting for reasons of personal advancement is not useful) and also the fact that 
once the viewer knows and understands what Gericault intends, she may not be prompted 
to understand the painting in relation to herself (how the interpretation of the painting can 
be of value to her).  
 
Some possible alternative ways to understand the painting can be the following. Among 
others, a viewer can concentrate on specific details of the painting and relate them to 
oneself; this concentration and relation to oneself is not usually conscious but takes place 
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automatically while the viewer looks at the work. For instance, in the detail where an old 
man holds in his hands the naked body of another man who is either dead or has lost 
consciousness, preventing him from falling in the water, can catch the viewer’s attention. 
This may prompt her to think she can become more sympathetic with other people or to 
even alert her to the fact that she can do so. Or it may awaken feelings of personal loss or 
of fear of such situations; or provide encouragement to keep going whatever the misery of 
the situation, or it may suggest that at the end of such a desperate situation there is still 
hopefulness. Another possibility of understanding that a viewer may experience is that she 
has become alerted to the fact that this event is possible (like for example that 
wretchedness is a possible state in life, something that she may have or may have not 
thought before). These meanings might go beyond the understanding Gericault gained 
through his intentions, but the painting seems to afford them and therefore the viewer can 
valuably relate them to her understanding.   
 
For that reason, there can be cases where artistic intentions distract the viewer from aspects 
of meaning that relate to her own experience (like Gericault aiming ambitiousness) and 
which as a result are non-intentional on the part of the artist (i.e. it is not Gericault’s 
intention that the viewer relate this to her experience and so feel more sympathetic towards 
others); in cases that for a viewer this constitutes a valuable understanding it can be 
accepted. My argument here consists of three positions: (1) there are artistic intentions that 
are relevant to artist’s understanding (like Gericault aiming at ambitiousness) and (2) 
intentions that are relevant to both artist and viewer (like the depiction of a wretched 
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situation) and (3) intentions that are not relevant to the viewer (like Gericault aiming at 
ambitiousness).  
 
This argument asserts that when the viewer genuinely receives certain aspects that valuably 
relate to her then she has a synaesthesis of the work because her interpretation is not a 
plain decoding of what the artist intended, but also a deeper understanding of the painting 
with relation to her own experience and of how this understanding is valuable to her. This, 
on its own, makes her understanding of the work valuable even in the case when she does 
not understand Gericault’s intention of providing an understanding of the survivors’ 
situation. Her understanding though, might not have been part of the artist’s intentions, but 
of the painting itself in relation to her. Hence, interpretation can leave space for meanings 
that are symptomatic and this can be acceptable. Sometimes the experience of meanings 
can be spectral, indeterminate, changeable, mercurial, deceptive, rather than simply falling 
on one side of a binary definition of ‘true’ and ‘non-appropriate’. They might not be an 
actual part of the contents of representation but they could be allowed if they add 
positively to the viewer’s understanding and experience. This leads to the conclusion that 
sometimes it can be the case that it is more important to understand something through the 
work (even if it is not part of the artist’s actual intention), rather than to simply know 
something about it (something that is generally agreed upon) without understanding it.  
 
Conclusion  
The above assumptions lead to the conclusion that there various ways to look at 
interpretation: (1) One way to interpret a painting is not just recovering an artist’s 
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intentions, (2) there are many ways to interpret painting that are valuably related to the 
viewer and (3) there is a wrong way to interpret painting. In summary of the above three 
sections, knowledge might be based on a generally agreed statement that for instance ‘the 
painting is about the raft of the Medusa which aims to an understanding of the survivors’ 
physical and emotional situation’. Understanding on the other hand may involve a deeper 
individual reception of the fact that ‘the painting is about the raft of the medusa which aims 
to an understanding of the survivors’ physical and emotional situation’. This does not aim 
to suggest that understanding cannot be shareable or that it is unique (many people can 
have the same or a similar understanding of a painting); it rather aims to promote an 
individual connection of the painting to the viewer where the painting works as a continual 
entity of possibilities used in the way the viewer thinks is most resourceful and valuable to 
her. This implies that understanding can be more profound than knowledge. Understanding 
of a painting can entail the viewer realizing something for herself that might not be part of 
what the artist realizes. The artist realizes something for herself too but as mentioned 
above it is very difficult to know if these parallel understandings can ever converge and 
whether knowledge of the artist’s intentions would facilitate such a convergence in order to 
lead to understanding. On a concluding note, I suggest that the question “What did the 
artist intend?” can lead to the understanding of a work but at the same time it may fix the 
mind of the viewer on a question which simply seeks to be answered rather than 
understood.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Painting and Language      
In this chapter, there is a presentation of another version of MAI, the view of art as 
conversation which basically claims that painting interpretation works in similar ways as 
language understanding functions in communication. In the first part, I start with the 
exploration of this view and then in the second part I continue with examining to what 
degree this view can be applied in painting in the same way it is applied in conversation. In 
the course of exploring this there is an elaboration on the differences between painting and 
language which essentially aims to suggest that interpreting painting is not confined to a 
system by contrast to language interpretation. In presenting this opinion, I will sometimes 
use both painting and literature examples in order to help support my claims.  
 
I.  
Painting as Conversation  
The most important premise in support of art as conversation is that the aim of art is 
communication. That is to say, an artist expresses or communicates meaning through her 
work which the viewer has to discover in order to have a correct interpretation. For a 
viewer to reach correct interpretation she has to grasp the artist’s intention. In the MAI 
framework a standard of correctness is important because it ensures that an interpretation is 
compatible with artistic intentions, and thus in this way misunderstandings and ambiguity 
are avoided. The conception of art as communication springs from the idea that in 
conversation speakers have to understand each other’s utterances in order to have 
meaningful communication. This is based on the fact that an utterance used for 
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communication can often have more than one interpretation, but it is what the utterer 
intended to convey through her utterance which is the correct interpretation of that 
utterance. For instance, when an utterer says A, but intends B, one should take into 
consideration A because if one focuses only on B, then communication is not successful. In 
other words, if a conversation is to keep going, then it is the utterer’s intended meaning 
that should concern us, not just what she actually said (Davies 2006 pp. 227-228). For 
painting as communication then, this entails that knowledge of the artist’s intention is the 
standard of correctness and helps viewers to avoid being distracted by incorrect meanings 
and misinterpretations.  
 
A detailed account of art as communication is provided by Noël Carroll (2004) who 
compares works of art to conversations. Simply put, works of art are viewed as 
‘communications’ from their artists. Carroll regards the interpreter’s encounter with a work 
as analogous to linguistic conversation. He maintains that when we read a literary work we 
try to connect with its author in a similar way to when we are engaged in a conversation. In 
particular, he says:  
“When we read a literary text or contemplate a painting, we enter a 
relationship with its creator that is roughly analogous to a conversation. 
Obviously, it is not as interactive as an ordinary conversation, for we are 
not receiving spontaneous feedback concerning our own responses. But 
just as an ordinary conversation gives us a stake in understanding our 
interlocutor, so does interaction with an artwork” (p. 284).  
 
Through this statement he suggests that we have ‘conversational’ interests when we 
experience artworks. This relation is not of course as direct as with a living interlocutor 
because we do not get an immediate response from the work. However, there is a certain 
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desire for communication with the work on the part of the viewer, so our relation to a 
painting is like a dialogue, where we seek to understand what our interlocutor has said, or 
at least try to find what she wished to convey by her utterance (pp. 280-284). This develops 
from the idea that when we are in a conversation we feel satisfied when we understand 
each other; according to Carroll, in the course of a conversation there is ‘a sense of 
community or communion that itself rests on communication’ (p. 284). Therefore, it is a 
requirement of a fulfilling conversation to grasp what the interlocutor meant or intended to 
say. If through a conversation we are left with only our conclusions, no matter how 
aesthetically rich they are, then we feel that something is missing and that we have ‘neither 
communed nor communicated’. He claims that “serious conversations do have, as a 
constitutive value, the prospect of community” (p. 285). This is further supported by the 
contention that artist’s intentions derive from artworks and that artist’s intentions and 
biographical information are significant to the understanding of the conversational aims we 
bring to artworks. In art as conversation, communication with the artwork – and artist – is 
one of the leading purposes of art and thus artistic intentions are a necessary part of 
interpretation (p. 288). The reason Carroll puts a lot of emphasis on the communicative 
aspect of art reception is a result of his belief that aesthetic pleasure we gain from an 
artwork is not enough because our interaction with it is a kind of conversation between the 
artist and the viewer which involves a desire to know what the artist intends, not only out 
of respect for the artist, but also because we have a personal interest to be capable 
respondents (p. 287). In the next part, we will discuss to what degree this view applies to 
painting interpretation.   
 
108 
 
 
II.  
Painting as Communication in painting interpretation  
I think that the conception that art is essentially about communication is a fundamental 
position within MAI, since MAI is principally a theory of meaning and is considerably 
influenced by the notion of communication in language. The core of the argument of the 
following part is that interpretation might not only be about the communication of artistic 
intentions; communication can be one of the aspects of making and interpreting painting, 
however, interpretation in its entirety encompasses other essential aspects as well which 
are not part of the theory of meaning. This is developed out of the idea that painting and 
language differ in some crucial respects, most importantly, in that painting is not a formal 
system like language. To support the argument of this part we will examine three 
differentiating characteristics between painting and language: rule-boundness, aesthetic 
experience and non-systematicity and creativity.  
(i) Rule-boundeness  
Language is a system of communication which is rule-bound – and committed to grammar, 
syntax, semantics, pragmatics and morphology, among others. In language use as it takes 
places in a conversation, a competent speaker has to follow a fixed structure and the formal 
conventions of language in order to reach a grammatically and syntactically correct 
utterance. The fundamental principle of the communication theory is that when we are in a 
conversation we aim to understand the interlocutor’s intentions in order to understand what 
she said. According to Grice: “we may say that ‘A meant something by x’ is roughly 
equivalent to ‘A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the 
recognition of this intention’” (Grice p. 384).  
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The theory of communication holds some truth as it concerns the fact that speakers have to 
understand the interlocutor’s intended meaning in order to reach successful 
communication. My aim in this section is not to reject the theory of communication itself 
but to suggest that while it may be true with regard to conversation, in painting 
interpretation it is not always analogously applied. My claim here is that understanding 
painting does not work in the same way as understanding language in conversation. The 
main doubt  about art as conversation is that it seems to imply that painting, on the part of 
the artist, is only a transference of intentions on a two-dimensional surface and that the 
artist creates only in order to communicate (this account neglects in a sense other crucial 
states the artist undergoes while painting such as pleasure and the states examined in 
chapter 3). On the part of the viewer, art as conversation suggests that interpretation is the 
identification of those intentions which are to be objectively perceived to a significant 
degree. This is discussed in the following way.   
Language is a system and a system is a set of rules, it requires justification, validity, 
explanation, evidence and sometimes correspondence. In language, according to the 
communication theory, a sentence uttered by a speaker is objective (since it follows certain 
rules). Sentences are bearers of certain meanings and therefore, a speaker has to remain 
within the frame of those meanings if the conversation is to keep going successfully. That 
is, she is not expected to receive a sentence in a supposed way she thinks it might be right; 
she has to receive it within the confines of a linguistic system and she is not encouraged to 
receive it in a different way other than that offered by the speaker. According to Iseminger:  
“My first claim is that the only reason for thinking that the author’s 
semantic intentions are in a way determinative of work-meaning is the 
conviction that as readers we normally have at least some conversational 
interest in the work… If the author’s semantic intentions in part 
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determine the meaning of the work, then works are standardly objects of 
readers’ conversational interests” (1996 p. 324). 
 
Iseminger’s claim seems to suggest that since authorial semantic intentions are important 
in the work’s interpretation that readers are expected to be conversationally interested in 
the work. That is to say, if they are conversationally interested then they are interested in 
authorial intentions in a sort of a conversational mode of the artist aiming to communicate 
something to the reader and as a result to encourage an objective meaning. I do not espouse 
the view that artists never have communicative intentions, but to claim that painting 
interpretation is not to be practiced in a rule-bound system that is similar to linguistic 
conversation – because it is art-bound – and that as the artist can unrestrictedly express 
herself, then the viewer has more freedom in interpreting than when interpreting language. 
Below we examine some examples in painting and literature which aim to show that the 
notion of rule-boundness in painting does not function in the same way and does not have 
the same kind of importance as in language. This claim is based on the supposition that in 
painting the viewer does not have as many ‘communicative’ limitations to conform to as in 
language because painting is not based on a formal system like language. This allows for 
more flexibility both to the methods a viewer uses to experience a painting and to the 
meaning she finds.  
 
In order to explain what the notion of flexibility entails I will use an example of Lucian 
Freud’s work. Two Irishmen22 represents two men in a room, one old man sitting and one 
younger man standing, both of them appear to be serious, sad and somehow pensive. One 
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 Table of Pictures, Figure 3.  
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could say that the representation shows more than one possibility of meaning. The first one 
contesting that it represents a father with his son, both being unhappy because of a family 
matter. A second assumption would be that it is the boss with his employee thinking over 
loss of money and another could be that they are a couple and they feel hopeless because 
they do not want to reveal their relationship. We do not know whether Lucian Freud 
intended one of these three interpretations in specific or none of those, but all three of them 
seem to be plausible and acceptable based on the postulation that the painting’s 
representation affords them in a sense. This suggests that in the case a viewer fails to 
understand Lucian Freud’s true intentions, she will not encounter the same kind of 
complications she would in the case of conversation; in conversation the speaker’s 
intention according to the Gricean model is what will ensure the right objective meaning 
(of course language communication is not only a matter of intention). But in painting 
interpretation the role of artistic intention does not need to be emphasized. The reason for 
not facing such difficulties in understanding in painting as is the case in conversation lies 
principally in the purposes of the two situations. In painting the purpose is not (only) to 
have an objective meaning while in conversation (where meaning springs from a linguistic 
system where words have specific sense, there are grammatical and syntactical rules, and 
speakers’ intentions are important) speakers are expected to have objective meaning in 
order to ensure effective communication. This leads to the supposition that painting does 
not fundamentally aim to create successful communication between artist and viewer in the 
same way language does among speakers. It should be stressed that the purpose of painting 
(both on the part of the artist and viewer) might be different than that of language (among 
speakers) in some respects. The purpose of painting, besides communication, might be to 
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provide pleasure, understanding, meaning, creativity, exploration, experimentation, the 
attempt to factually turn a mental image or picture of reality to a material picture. The 
purpose of language might be to enhance communication between humans by expressing 
themselves through it and to carry information about the world.  
 
At this point it is important to highlight the notion of flexibility in painting; flexibility in 
painting allows the artist to paint so to speak in a ‘wrong’ way or to ‘make mistakes’. A 
mistake deviates from what is right or accepted by a certain community. In conversation, 
speakers are expected to be competent to a certain degree in speaking correctly, by being in 
agreement with certain rules which will enable them to avoid mistakes so that successful 
communication is achieved among speakers. However, in the realm of painting there are 
many paintings with ‘mistakes’. One could say that in realistic and figurative painting there 
are noticeable mistakes identified even by viewers who are not artistically educated or are 
art connoisseurs. There is an abundance of such examples, like disproportionate parts of 
the body or other elements on the painting, wrong use of perspective, light and shading. 
Here, we mention only a few: Ingres’ Odalisque23 represents a nude woman having 
disproportionately elongated bodily features and the upper part of the body seems to be 
shorter in proportion with the lower part of the body; Matisse in The Red Studio
24
 uses 
wrong perspective. With regard to contemporary painting the notion of mistake becomes 
even more diminished; in abstract painting
25
 it is very difficult to discern a mistake because 
it is largely non-figurative or non-realistic and thus in this case the notion of mistake nearly 
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 Table of Pictures, Figure 4. 
24
 Table of Pictures, Figure 5.  
25
 Abstract art does not give the illusion of visible reality; it is non-figurative, non-representational and non-
objective and is a kind of art which is liberated from motif  (Read 1991, p. 170).   
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disappears. Paintings by Picasso, Miro, De Kooning and many others seem to neglect 
(traditional) painting strategies and use asymmetry, flat representation, emphatically 
disproportioned elements and uncombined colours. It can be said that these are part of the 
paintings’ meaning and that is why they are painted as such. If we assume they are part of 
meaning, we interpret them having in mind that despite the fact that they are ‘wrongly’ 
depicted they are still meaningful in their ‘wrong’ fashion and thus there is no difficulty in 
reaching interpretation. In a grammatically or syntactically wrong utterance it is difficult to 
assert that such a mistake is part of the utterance’s meaning because utterances are true 
depending on certain linguistic rules. Here, we must note that there are deliberate and 
accidental mistakes in language. Deliberate mistakes like when a speaker wrongly 
describes a thing and accidental like slips of the tongue (there is an example of this later 
below). Speakers of a linguistic community usually grasp such mistakes and keep the 
conversation going (they do not result in unintelligibility) but speakers define those as 
mistakes and mistakes can occur up to a certain degree. That is, language affords some 
mistakes that do not disrupt intelligibility but it cannot afford as many as painting. There is 
limitation of the number of mistakes in language, otherwise if those are far too many this 
will lead to gibberish. In painting an artist can make an unlimited number of mistakes and 
this will not disrupt intelligibility as painting is not liable to a system such as language. In 
other words, there is no formal definition of mistake in painting while in language there is, 
and when it is violated to a large degree then it results to nonsense. In painting, even 
though the characteristics mentioned above can be perceived as mistakes they do not 
violate any formally stated guidelines or rules
26
 of painting as they do in language and 
                                                          
26
 In the following section there is a brief examination of the notion of rules in painting.  
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therefore as such they do not readily lead to an incorrect interpretation as they do in 
language. This points to the idea that it is less important to establish mistakes in painting.  
We now proceed to an analogous example of mistake from literature to help strengthen the 
assumption made in the previous paragraph. Poets can sometimes use language in a 
‘wrong’ way, disrupting the rules of grammar or syntax to some degree. Such an example 
can be Rastafarian poets who have their own modified language called ‘lyaric’ where one 
discerns many language mistakes and a lot of slang. Yet, this does not constitute a 
difficulty in their poetry as those ‘wrong’ aspects can be conceived of as part of the poem’s 
rhythm and meaning and thus not as mistakes in the use of language of the poet’s 
technique. In language, when a speaker uses language in a wrong way (i.e. grammatically 
or syntactically) it is possible to be easily incomprehensible. That is to say, a poet can 
violate some rules of language more flexibly than a speaker in a conversation and still be 
intelligible and well accepted by the art community, although even in poetry the poet has to 
follow the rules of language to a large degree. Through the notion of flexibility it is 
contested that a mistake in language is clearly defined, like for example in “John go to the 
cinema”, where ‘go’ needs to take ‘es’, while in painting and literature the definition of 
mistake is not as clearly determined and this as a result leaves room for certain violations.  
 
Moreover, unintelligibility and incoherence to some degree can be acceptable in literature 
while in language this can cause lapses in communication. For instance, in Samuel 
Beckett’s play Waiting for Godot there are repeatedly incoherent sentences and the use of 
language is sometimes incongruent and purposeless. By contrast, in conversation, it is 
difficult to ground a meaningful conversation on such elements and one cannot speak 
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absurdly in such a way unless she does not wish to be understood and hence successful 
communication fails. In addition to this, although literature’s medium is language, 
sentences of literature do not count objectivity in the same way as sentences in a 
conversation. In literature, ordinary language becomes something other than a ‘plain’ 
instance of language and there are no explicit restrictions, as is the case with ordinary 
language, to stick with the literal meaning of the words. It should be emphasized that the 
reader has more flexibility to conjecture connotations even when those are not part of the 
word’s or sentence’s literal meaning. In conversation it is quite unusual to encourage 
further meanings other than those dictated by the speaker. This links to what is suggested 
in the previous paragraph with the notion of mistake. A mistake in painting can be easily 
dismissed or even be unnoticed, by contrast to a linguistic sentence.  
 
Despite the fact that there is more flexibility of the use of language in literature than in 
conversation, I argue that in the context of painting, rule-boundness becomes even less 
significant than in the context of other forms of art which are part of a notational system 
like literature and music. This is grounded on the fact that paintings are free from the 
restrictions of linguistic meaning. Literary works use language – they are, in essence, a 
‘notated’ form – whereas paintings use a different tool and do not use or constitute any 
kind of notation. According to Goodman, literature’s tool is language and thus it belongs to 
a notational system since it is constituted by a set of syntactical and semantic rules, that is 
to say, it is a linguistic system (1976, pp. 207-11). On the other hand, painting is not a 
notated form because it is formed by pictures and thus is a non-linguistic system (1976, pp. 
194-98). We should note here that there is a dictionary which translates or explains words 
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but there is no established dictionary to translate or explain pictures. Indeed, if there were 
such a thing then it would most likely prove unsuccessful as it would use one tool to 
translate another tool; that is to say, in standard linguistic dictionaries words are translated 
through words, but in the case of a dictionary of pictures, pictures would be translated 
through words. If this were somehow feasible, then pictures should be translated by 
pictures, in a system of like-for-like relational correspondence. The transition from one 
tool to another seems to change the rendition. Whilst there might be books on symbolism 
which include lists of symbols and signs along with their meaning and various colours with 
possible psychological meanings, it is impossible to have a directory or lexicon of 
pictures.
27
 This is a difficulty that derives from the fact that while it might be easier to 
recognize the constituents of a sentence or words (letters) and find their meaning in the 
dictionary, it is difficult to define the constituents of pictures and even more difficult to 
create a directory of them.  
In art as conversation the notion of objectivity of meaning emphasizes the importance of 
identifying the artist’s intentions in the work. This view seems to overlook the fact that 
painting can involve unrestricted expression, while language is tied up by rules and 
therefore expression is not as unrestricted as in painting.  
 
                                                          
27 Perhaps one could say that art related books work somehow like directories where someone finds and 
compiles information about paintings, alongside criticism and possible descriptions and explanations of the 
works. One could propose that it would be profitable if art books only included pictures, with the size, 
medium and perhaps the artist’s name next to each painting (to cater for the viewer who is interested in a 
specific artist’s work and wishes to see more paintings by her). The fact that there is usually a great deal of 
written language accompanying reproductions of paintings, usually in the form of description, means that the 
interpretation of painting becomes more descriptive. In cases like this, the viewer may therefore read a 
painting rather than look at it and experience it in a painterly and pictorial fashion. This amounts to the fact 
that when the viewer reads a painting, the encounter with the work might turn out to be more descriptive and 
informative than experientially understood through visual terms and sometimes the use of criticism limits or 
makes the search of more meanings unnecessary.  
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(ii) Aesthetic experience and function in conversation and painting 
The communicative model of interpretation as the view of art as conversation presents it, is 
marked by some weaknesses when it comes to another important aspect of interpretation. 
The main doubt of this section is rooted in the suggestion that the process of experiencing 
or understanding painting can have more dimensions than the communicative. When we 
look at a painting, we are in a sensate environment and thus a painting might not be a 
readable object which tries to communicate, explain or justify something, but it may 
prompt us to feel something through it; this kind of experience induces the aesthetic and 
involves dimensions such as pleasure and contentment. This claim suggests that painting 
might not only be communicative, but conversation might be (although this is doubtful). 
As it has been already mentioned in the previous section, in conversation the speaker 
determines what she says and the listener expects to understand what she intends to say. 
Therefore, the speaker’s intentions are important to identify in conversation. This points to 
the difference between painting and conversation which arises from the fact that in 
conversation words have a conventional, fixed meaning, while representations in painting 
do not only or always carry meaning and objective meaning itself is not the only 
(important) aspect of painting. Painting has representational – semantic – meaning but 
interpretation of it is not only directed at meaning but at other aspects too. In fact, many 
artists have explicitly claimed that their work does not involve objective meaning but is 
there to be experienced in aesthetic terms. Specifically, Kandinsky’s experience in 1908 of 
accidentally coming across an abstract picture was this:  
“I was returning, immersed in thought, from my sketching, when on opening 
the studio door, I was suddenly confronted by a picture of indescribable and 
incandescent loveliness. Bewildered, I stopped staring at it. The painting 
lacked all subject, depicted no identifiable object and was entirely composed 
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of bright colour-patches. Finally I approached closer and only then 
recognized it for what it really was – my own painting, standing on its side on 
the easel…. One thing became clear to me – that objectiveness, the depiction 
of objects, needed no place in my paintings, and was indeed harmful to them” 
(Read 1991, p. 190). 
The notion of aesthetic feeling in painting interpretation is developed in the following way. 
When a speaker is in the course of a conversation, she can experience certain feelings like 
contentment or satisfaction of having expressed herself or feel pleasure in listening to her 
interlocutor because she speaks eloquently or feel content of having successfully 
communicated with other speakers. Besides these feelings, among others, it is 
uncharacteristic for speakers to have further aesthetic pleasure or feelings in the course of 
conversation. It seems that it is not typical for conversation to create aesthetic responses in 
speakers as is the case with viewers in interpreting painting. This contention is founded on 
the fact that in painting interpretation, pleasure and feelings have a chief role and they are 
experienced by viewers in special ways, different than the ways experienced in 
conversation. That is to say, when a speaker is in the process of receiving utterances she is 
not involved in any kind of sensual atmosphere in that she is not expected to perceive the 
understanding of utterances through the aesthetic. For instance, when a viewer 
contemplates the Raft of the Medusa she can experience a rich diversity of feelings like 
awe, beauty, disgust, fear and so on, but when a speaker comes to understand an utterance 
in conversation, while she can experience those feelings, she does not experience them in 
an analogous way as in painting. There is something distinctive in experiencing feelings in 
painting than in utterances of conversation. This results from the fact that paintings reveal 
in special ways. For example, the Raft of the Medusa affords to reveal awe, beauty, disgust 
and fear; the issue here is that those feelings are not revealed in the same way a speaker 
reveals them in a conversation. In painting those feelings are felt through ineffability – 
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they are shown through a quality which differentiates experience of painting from that of 
conversation. This quality I call ambiance. Ambiance might be the result of the use of the 
medium, skill and technique, which is the way by which a painting is revealed. To enhance 
this view I link Stephen Davies’ view of the ‘representational character’ to what I call the 
ambiance of a painting. Davies claims that:  
“Although, in general, the fact that we seek aesthetic satisfaction from 
representational paintings more readily than from architects’ drawings 
rests on the belief that the most aesthetically rewarding viewing of a 
painting corresponds to a viewing of that which it represents, an 
aesthetic interest, in any particular painting is concerned foremost with 
the representational character of the work rather than with that which 
it represents” (Davies: 1982 p. 73).  
I think Davies is right to claim that we have an aesthetic interest not with what is 
represented but in the representational character of a work. There is something distinctive 
about the representational character of painting which reveals the medium, skill and 
technique in special visual aesthetic ways.  
To help support my view in play – which is based on the claim that conversational speech, 
unlike most cases in art, does not normally require skill in the same way as painting does – 
we will explore the notion of skill. Conversational powers do require a kind of skill but 
skill in painting involves a broader range which is associated to the ambiance of a work. 
Skill in the case of painting might be a pursuit to repeatedly practice techniques by the use 
of medium, to experiment with a variety of materials and an attempt to factually place a 
picture on a two-dimensional surface. All these actions take place simultaneously so it is 
difficult to separate skill from medium and technique as they are all interconnected. 
Something analogous is involved in the production of literature where sentences of novels 
or verses of a poem are not merely sequences of words which a competent speaker utters 
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fluently. The words have a literal meaning but in the act of writing the author employs 
certain techniques or follows a specific artistic style – attempting, for example, to make the 
verse sound skilfully beautiful (or indeed skilfully ugly) or at least to give it some form 
that will distinguish it from ordinary speech. She tries, in other words, to make it art. In 
conversation, when one utters a sentence she does not make attempts to make her 
utterances sound like art (if she does so, this may result in singing or reciting poetry); she 
may indeed employ skills and speak conversationally nice, but her intention in most 
probabilities is to convey her intended meaning. However, in literature, words do not only 
possess mere meaning but also other properties like sound, rhythm, form, shape and 
abstraction, which in conversation can be barely noticeable, if they are relevant at all. In 
addition to this, in literature, a kind of art that is conscientiously related to language and 
linguistic meaning, the reader or the listener of a poem who understands the language in 
which the poem is written enjoys other aspects of language, like rhythm, sound, the 
connection and adjacency of words and letters and so on. Even in case when a reader does 
not understand a certain language at all, she may read a poem again and again just for the 
sake of listening to it or of enjoying its properties without really understanding what verses 
mean. This is the result of the way the poet writes which emits a certain ambiance of 
pleasure to the reader. The properties of a poem are the result of the way it is written – the 
medium is unbreakably tied with properties and one cannot occur without the other. The 
notion of ‘way’ is not ineludibly translatable or transferable only through language. 
Language is only one of the properties of a poem among many others. A similar example 
seems to be the case of music with lyrics. Sometimes people enjoy listening to foreign 
language songs without understanding the meaning of the lyrics and therefore the 
121 
 
 
composer’s intentions. Yet, there is a certain ambiance in songs that makes people who do 
not understand the specific language in which they are performed, intensely enjoy listening 
to them. We should note that understanding the meaning of language in these instances 
provides a richer interpretation of both literature and music. What is being emphasized is 
that even in the case of non-language understanding there are other elements which can 
serve interpretation while in conversation speakers are necessarily tied up to the meanings 
of language and have no other ways to experience it other than to identify the speaker’s 
objective meaning. 
 
In addition to this, individual skills in painting can offer different meanings, despite the 
fact that there are paintings with similar objective representations. Artists have different 
kinds of skill and thus their work emits different ambiance. For example, Gericault, Van 
Gogh and Basquiat painted skulls.
28
 It is obvious that all three of them use different kinds 
of skill. If we compare some of their paintings
 
we may reach the conclusion that in some 
cases their paintings have similar representational aspects, something that can lead to 
similar semantic meanings and intentions, but the forceful difference in technique and skill 
makes the viewer experience them on very different aesthetic levels. The aesthetic 
experience of Basquiat’s painting can make the viewer experience forms in a more 
primitive and basic way, by contrast to Gericault’s skill which may induce feelings of 
exactness and elaboration through its form and dissimilarly with Van Gogh’s skill which 
offers the viewers a kind of index of the artist’s movements because of visible and heavy 
brush strokes. In addition to this, in the realm of painting still life has been very much 
                                                          
28
 Table of Pictures, Figure 6, 7 and 8.  
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depicted and practiced and a lot of it has very similar semantic meanings and intentions, 
yet it is the ambiance of each individual artist’s skill and the use of the medium which 
makes those paintings emit a different aesthetic experience. If we suppose that our goal for 
interpretation is objective meaning resulting from the artist’s intentions then we would 
have the same objective meaning for very many still life paintings. Despite that, looking at 
different still life paintings which depict very similar objects and settings (and which 
therefore have similar objective meanings) that yet they are so differently depicted. This 
suggests that the viewer is offered the chance to experience painting in more ways than 
only the communicative; she can reach an aesthetic understanding of the painting by means 
of the rich variety of skills, media and techniques used by painters. A question that arises 
here is: ‘what would be the value of still life if we only consider it in the realm of the 
communicative?’ A still life which represents two apples, a jar, a hat and a table, does not 
seem to give a meaningful understanding as the Raft of the Medusa probably gives. It just 
represents these objects and in itself it is hard to convey a meaningful understanding. It is 
for this reason that aesthetic experience, which results from the ambiance of the work, is 
given emphasis in this context.  
At this point it must be highlighted that ambiance might also be the result of the medium 
and representation being one. A painting is inextricably the same thing as its 
representation; the medium reveals the representation (and therefore the possible content-
meaning) and representation reveals the medium and one cannot exist without the other on 
the surface of a painting. This is the case in painting by contrast to language, which is 
based on an arbitrariness model between a word (symbol) and its meaning. On this model, 
a word could mean something other than what it means and to be uttered differently; a 
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painting is not based on such a model where a symbol (a representation or elements of 
representation) is related to a meaning which could be otherwise. This relates to the 
concept of specificity in painting. A painting, for instance, shows a specific table, while in 
language the word table can be any table, there is not any specific table represented and 
moreover the symbols of the word table are not connected meaningfully to what it 
signifies. In painting, the medium is inseparable from representation-content and thus a 
painting cannot be otherwise. This assumption leads to a reason for thinking that since 
painting does not function in virtue of a symbolic system like language it has more 
dimensions than the communicative ones. There are times when the reception of painting 
concerns the experience of it in some certain ways, which does not essentially aim at 
interpreting it objectively and meaningfully in the sense of communication (like in still 
life). It is true that some kinds of art provide greater inducement to meaningfully interpret 
than others - like representational painting (religious, renaissance, realism, impressionism). 
But genres like abstract painting (suprematism
29
, minimal painting, abstract expressionism) 
do not induce us so much to interpret them in a meaningful way. A model of interpretation 
based on the aesthetic has been more forcefully adopted with the emergence of abstract and 
conceptual painting, which does not represent in the way figurative or realistic painting 
                                                          
29 Kasimir Malevich was the founder of suprematism and by contrast to the automatism and spontaneity of 
surrealism he had a logical mind and was cautious and precise when he was painting. He contended that the 
reality in art was the sensational effect of colour itself. In a painting he exhibited in 1915, an image of a black 
square on a white background (Table of Pictures, Figure 9) he held that the basis of all art was the feeling 
this contrast induced. “For the suprematist, therefore, the proper means is the one that provides the fullest 
expression of pure feeling and ignores the habitually accepted object. The object in itself is meaningless to 
him; and the ideas of the conscious mind are worthless. Feeling is the decisive factor… and thus art arrives at 
non-objective representation – at suprematism” (Read 2000, p. 204).   
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does. Although in all painting medium and representation are one, in abstract and 
conceptual painting this is more obvious.  
As a way of example, Arthur Danto suggests that in contemporary art some artists, like 
Jasper Johns, managed to collapse the distance between vehicle and content, rendering thus 
the properties of the thing shown coincident with the properties of the vehicle. This as a 
result, abolished the semantic space between reality and art (Danto 1974, p. 148). This 
implies that this kind of art is unconstrained by the separation of content and medium as 
the two become one, and thus the semantic parameters of the work do not lie in the content 
(as representation of something meaningful) but in the medium itself. This kind of art is 
created in such a way as to make viewers interpret the work in an experiential way. It 
involves a pure experience and experience in these terms is not perceived as meaning in 
the ‘traditional’ way. Kandinsky for instance, desired to paint what can be meaningful 
beyond appearances and claimed that colours have physical effects and encourage moods 
and feelings. In his own words, the painting is:   
“A construction of concrete elements of form and colour which become 
expressive in the process of synthesis or arrangement: the form of the work of 
art is in itself the content, and whatever expressiveness there is in the work of 
art originates with the form” (Read 1991, p. 194-195). 
He expounds a notion of form that is the same thing as the content and this in itself is in a 
sense the subject of painting. The same applies for Pollock for whom it has been reported 
that at the end of 1943 he was concentrated on painting Peggy Guggenheim’s mural and 
one of his main problems before delivering his work was to discover what his true subject 
was. After months of being indecisive about the mural’s subject he decided that his ‘mode 
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of creation constitute his theme’. That is to say, the process of painting itself was the 
subject of his work (Landau 1989, p. 26).  
 My suggestion at this point is that the assemblage of medium and representation might be 
more noticeable and understandable in abstract painting, but at the same time realistic and 
figurative painting is in a sense also abstract and thus in all genres medium and 
representation are one. To better explain this claim, when an artist paints realistically she 
does not strictly paint reality (world) exactly as it is. By taking some examples throughout 
many periods of the history of painting, we see that realistic paintings are painted in an 
abstract way in a sense. For instance, religious, renaissance, baroque, romanticist and 
impressionist painting is figurative but it is not actually realistic; the way it is depicted has 
reference to the readily visible reality but it is not strictly realistic. While painting 
realistically or abstractly artists employ similar elements and skills. The way objects 
(reality) are depicted both in realistic painting is utterly painterly with a great variety of 
skills and techniques. One can say that in realism
30
 reality is depicted as it is, although 
there again it is difficult to austerely hold that. Lastly, when we have a careful look at 
reality we see that objects do not have a fixed shape or colour, where they actually begin or 
end, or when we look at objects from close up or from a long distance they become 
visually abstract.    
In this section the notion of aesthetic experience stresses that in interpretation viewers are 
involved in more roles than only the communicative ones. This places objectivity of 
meaning on a secondary level in favor of the aesthetic experience.   
                                                          
30
 Some of the most popular realists are Courbet, Millet, Corot and Homer.   
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(iii) The notions of non-systematicity and creativity in interpretation  
So far, it has been advocated that there can be other possibilities for interpretation that are 
separate from objective and communicative meaningfulness and that viewers are involved 
in a kind of aesthetic experience. This will be further supported by the notion of creativity 
on the part of the viewer. It appears that the scheme put forward by the view of art as 
conversation in respect of interpretation refers to a correspondence system. Namely, it 
considers that interpretive claims about paintings are true depending on whether they stand 
in an appropriate and compatible relation to the artist’s intentions and that in fact 
interpretation is confined by artistic intentions. Specifically, Carroll while referring to 
artworks claims that “Our best hypotheses about their actual intentions should constrain 
our interpretations of artworks. That is, how we place the artist and her purposes is relevant 
to artistic interpretations” (1997 p. 308). Following his line, in order for an interpretation to 
be correct it has to comply with the artist’s intention – it is judged as true based on this 
premise – and hence it needs supportive reasons in order to be substantial. Essentially, 
Carroll here sounds to fall under EAI as through his statement he says that interpretations 
are constrained by intentions, implying in that way that they are limited (to intentions). 
This reminds a similar view formulated by Hirsch according to which one should seek to 
identify the author’s intentions in order to form a sound and objective interpretation, which 
leads in his opinion to the best interpretation. He claims that “Validity of interpretation is 
not the same as inventiveness of interpretation. Validity implies the correspondence of an 
interpretation to a meaning which is represented by the text” (1992, p. 396). Hirsch seems 
to overtly adopt the view of art as conversation as he equates the method of gaining 
understanding about a work with language understanding and seems to have been strongly 
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influenced by the correspondence theory of language which holds that true statements 
correspond with reality and false statements fail to do so and sentences correspond with 
states of affair in the world. That is to say, if the meaning of a sentence corresponds to a 
state of affairs in the world (i.e. the cat is on the table) then the sentence is true; if it does 
not correspond then it is false. Therefore, along these lines sentences in language are 
essentially true or false. Maybe this definition of truth applies to representational systems 
like language (although philosophers contend that there are problems in accepting this). 
Nevertheless, in painting it is difficult to say that the viewer’s interpretation has to 
correspond with the artist’s intentions, as is the case in conversation where speakers need 
to identify each other’s intentions in order to conduct a meaningful conversation. In this 
way the actual intentionalist places the viewer in a kind of conditioning and disregards the 
fact that painting does not entail the same kind of understanding as language does and thus 
supports a systematized interpretation. Interpretation per se cannot be systematized; such 
systematization entails finite and predetermined interpretation and experience of painting, 
something that can lead to the recycling and sterility of interpretations. Art as conversation 
theory can be applied in painting interpretation as a complementary in order to structure 
and organize concepts, like to orientate the work in history, give the viewer information 
about its maker, her life and aspirations, but it should not be authoritatively used as the 
primary and fundamental instrument for the reason that it can impede a creative and 
imaginative interpretive process.   
The above claim essentially assumes that the very act of searching for the possibility of 
different meanings within a painting – without being confined by the system which 
prescribes that viewers have to be aware of the artist’s intentions because the artist wishes 
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to communicate like in conversation – can be an enormously rewarding experience for the 
viewer, even in the case when she has no evidence to justify whether her interpretation is 
true or compatible with artistic intentions. For this act makes the viewer ‘stretch’ the mind 
and in itself promotes ingenuity and resourcefulness. Through this approach, it is as though 
painting interpretation works as a means of training and stimulating one’s mind. At this 
point it is interesting to mention Bohm’s and Peat’s suggestion that “the creative person 
does not strictly know what he or she is looking for” as new thoughts typically arise from 
creative ‘play of the mind’. When the creative play is in action innovative perceptions 
result which make people propose new ideas, prompting exploration (1989, pp. 48-50). 
This remark also engenders resonances to Rene Magritte who wrote in one of his letters:  
“I conceive of the art of painting as the science of juxtaposing colours in such 
a way that their actual appearance disappears and lets a poetic image 
emerge… There are no ‘subjects’, no ‘themes’ in my painting. It is a matter of 
imagining images whose poetry restores to what is known that which is 
absolutely unknown and unknowable” (Alexandrian 1995, p.7).     
His statement seems to assert that since the actual appearance of colours disappears and 
this lets a poetic image emerge that the image itself is not objective, it has no theme, and 
thus imagination transpires and gives way to what is unknown and unknowable. The sense 
of imagination, uncertainty and aporia as well as liberation from logical conclusiveness are 
resourceful and bring about constructive thoughts about how the world is to be perceived 
through the revelations of painting. It is vital for the viewer to be encouraged to come up 
with fresh and unknown perceptions through experiencing painting. As mentioned before, 
painting – and all art in general – is different than other situations like language, therefore, 
venturing to experience it outside systematic limitations enhances the search of what might 
come after the discovery of one boundary (interpretation) and then after another and so on. 
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In conversation, it is not typical for a speaker to relate an utterance to her inner perceptions 
and experiences creatively and she is not encouraged to receive it in a new way she wishes 
to explore.  
 
Language understanding and understanding gained through painting entail two different 
approaches to understanding the world: in painting, understanding can be relative to the 
viewer (as discussed in the previous chapter) but in language, understanding tends to be 
more objective as it is confined within a certain rule-bound system. Notably, viewers do 
not need to realize the same thing, as is the case in language, where all the speakers who 
obtain understanding about what a certain sentence means have to grasp it in the same way. 
What should be emphasized here is that viewers may have distinctive inclinations when 
experiencing painting. The outcome of an endeavour to find out something through the 
experience of painting can involve a different adventure for each viewer. This does not 
imply that interpretation is a matter of mere whim; in the realm of pleasure and emotional 
understanding, we do not get it from the painting just because we want it or need it – we 
find it there if the painting merits that response in a sense. It suggests that it is valuable for 
the viewer to create narratives and suppositions in her mind about what she sees in a 
painting. Conversely, art as conversation theory hinders expansion of creativity and 
excitement of imagination; the notion of ‘stretch’ mentioned above can be experienced by 
going beyond the limitations of the MA intentionalist system which embraces objective 
interpretation. Even in cases when one is not aware of any intentions or criticism about a 
work one can still interpret it since one of the inexplicable properties of painting is that it 
reveals itself to the viewer without any external assistance. 
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The reason for not wishing to utterly adopt art as conversation is because such a 
conversational system-approach is too perfunctory and rigid for painting interpretation. 
The interpretation a viewer experiences does not require to be validated by what the best 
evidence indicates or with what is logically conclusive from the artist’s intentions, as is the 
case of speakers’ intentions in conversation. I do not mean that such a deductive method is 
not at all useful as, among others, it may promote justification of one’s thoughts. 
Nevertheless, it does not constitute the most appropriate model for painting interpretation 
because it can lead the viewer to a closed conclusion. It is true that mere belief about a 
painting does not qualify as evidence, but the idea highlighted here is that ‘to qualify for 
evidence’ does not constitute a necessary condition for interpretation. The primary goal is 
to prompt originality and inventiveness, so various means and methods used to reach these 
goals are acceptable, even if they do not qualify as evidence.  
Through the following point which concerns the artist-viewer and speaker-interlocutor 
relation I wish to stress that the examination of these relations will help understand that a 
viewer’s interpretation process is similar to the artist’s creative process and a speaker’s 
understanding process in a conversation is similar to the interlocutor’s utterance process. 
To demonstrate the point, there is a very brief repetition of some of what is said in chapter 
3 about what an artist does when she paints. An artist usually begins with a general idea, or 
conception and she may start off with preliminary sketches. When she sets out to paint on 
the canvas a new challenge takes place: she can stick to her previous conception or not, 
and usually through the very act of painting she allows her work to develop into something 
she has not previously thought of or intended. Even in the case of her faithfully following 
her initial plan she does not feel any imperatives to do so; she is doing so because she 
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herself decides to. In other words, she does not have a conception which she applies by 
means of techniques and materials in a canonical or systematized way, rather her 
techniques and materials develop out of her conceptions in an individual way which is 
flexible and liable to change as she creates. Techniques do exist independently of what one 
conceives oneself as doing, though they get taken in certain directions when used by artists 
in practice. Artist’s methods and processes are not confined within a rule-bound system 
like language where a speaker must speak in accordance with the rules that govern 
language; that is, what an artist produces is not subject to such inflexible rules. Of course, 
in painting there are some rules artists learn in art schools, through books, by practice and 
so on; such rules include for instance the fact that an artist should only mix two or three 
colours together at a time otherwise the result will be muddy or that to make something 
recede in the distance an artist should use a cool colour. These rules, among many others, 
do not always work like that and they can be effortlessly disregarded when an artist either 
consciously or unconsciously decides to do so. The emphasis here is that while painting, 
the artist, unlike the speaker, finds herself outside the rigidity of system. Analogously, 
while interpreting, the viewer reacts in a similar way to the artist, that is, she interprets 
painting in accordance to no system. She also, like the artist, has the aptitude to be non-
systematic since she is not interpreting within certain canonical confines. The artist-viewer 
relation is less systematized than the speaker-interlocutor relation. The first one is based on 
creativity, on generativity of meaning, on going beyond what is readily seen or what is 
logically thinkable; while the second is based on creativity and generativity to some degree 
it is also founded on (some) inflexible rules which place speakers within certain linguistic 
frames.   
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As it has just been argued, knowledge of artistic intentions being the standard of 
correctness, in the way it is articulated by art as conversational, might be too restrictive to 
fit within the realm of painting interpretation. Interpretation in the context of such a system 
entails a kind of telos. That is to say, beyond what the artist intends and what is discovered 
through her interviews and diaries, everything else can be irrelevant; this as a method itself 
seems to be teleological and therefore takes interpretation up to a certain end. This hints 
towards a monolithic process of interpretation. The contention of this section suggests that 
non-systematicity in painting interpretation takes place when thoughts and actions lack a 
sense of telos and thus the viewer has the advantage for inventiveness and originality. As it 
has been pointed out in the previous chapter, it is possible for a viewer to invent more than 
what the artist intends. The very process of repudiating telos and pursuing creativity makes 
it worth looking at a painting even in the case where the viewer may not rightly identify 
the artist’s intentions. 
I further assume that establishing painting interpretation on the view of art as conversation 
may concern a psychological matter. That is, sometimes there is a certain degree of 
concern on the part of the viewer to confidently search for interpretations that are not part 
of what the artist has intended. There is unease or uncertainty as regards the grounding of a 
viewer’s interpretation according to her creative beliefs and conceptions because this 
cannot be systematically validated or justified. In addition to this, the viewer may also feel 
that because a work is an artist’s creation that she should interpret it according to artistic 
intentions out of respect for the artist. It is true that in the context of art as conversation 
there is no special place for non-systematicity since our creative beliefs and conceptions 
have to be validated by something external to ourselves, something that secures us that our 
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beliefs are true based on the fact that they can be justified on certain premises. There is an 
instinctive fretfulness in painting about what is it really – a kind of wonder around its 
presence. The question that arises here is why should there be a standard of correctness if 
painting itself does not function like a linguistic system and since it can neither be 
substantiated as correct nor incorrect?  
 
This can be approached as follows. One of the beautiful mysteries of painting is that its 
indefinableness lies in its not being established on any logical system or if it is, this system 
does not work like a formal linguistic system. If it did, it would follow that the meanings of 
painting are gained in virtue of the symbolic representation of the world, like it is the case 
in language. This is associated with the idea that painting is mystical and mysterious, both 
for the artist and the viewer, and therefore any justification or validity of it would be 
redundant. Painting emits a special kind of ambiance, one where words and explanation are 
not necessary prerequisites as it encapsulates an awesome silence. It seems intuitive to me 
to assume that mystery resists a system and since painting is a kind of mystery it also 
resists one. Mystery might not be liable to or explained though language since it goes 
beyond systematic understanding. This directs to the hypothesis that there is a certain 
degree of risk in mystery because there is no linguistic explanation of it and perhaps this is 
one of the reasons that art as conversation avoids embracing it with regard to painting 
interpretation. 
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Conclusion 
The above discussion suggests that the view of art as conversation does not provide an 
adequate account of painting interpretation as it assumes it functions like linguistic 
interpretation. Art as conversation strongly relies on objective meaning and as a result it 
leaves behind crucial aspects like aesthetic experience and creativity on the part of the 
viewer.  Understanding in conversation is based on a community which shares the same 
language rules, while painting interpretation does not require such sharable rules followed 
by a certain community in order to be understood. Painting interpretation can function 
more individually, by contrast to language where noncompliance to the rules of syntax or 
grammar can lead to communicative chaos. In conversation, speakers have to follow the 
rules of a shared language and rules constitute the standard of correctness of such a formal 
system. Conversely, in painting rules can be privately followed as well as ignored.       
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Epilogue  
 
This project has investigated the notion of intention in making and interpreting painting. 
The examination of intention assists in our understanding of the value of artistic intentions 
in painting interpretation. The current research was not specifically undertaken to criticize 
Anscombe’s account of intention but to use it alongside MAI view in order to provide a 
different insight as to how intention might work in the production of painting. I do not 
reject MAI, but I suggest some weaknesses which can assist create a new model of 
interpretation.  
 
Throughout it has been argued that artists do not only have intentions when they paint, but 
they also undergo other states and engage in actions which are not always intentional. 
Indeed, artists have intentions; nonetheless, their intentions are often penetrated by reasons 
for acting which are not as clear as those of everyday actions. Inspiration, desire and 
intention to experiment are different in nature because they cannot be as clearly justified as 
everyday actions and as such they do not establish a meaningful reason that gives 
information or explanation of the artist’s action as instances of everyday actions might do. 
These states involve a more complex account of intention than that provided for everyday 
actions. Artistic intentions, states and actions are inclined to a sense of exploration where 
the end-result is unknown and the process of making is variable and very important. The 
assertion that artistic intentions encompass states and actions that cannot be explained even 
by artists, points to the view that knowledge of them on the part of the viewer might not be 
valuable in that they do not provide an instructive ground for meaningful interpretation.  
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It has also been discussed that to understand what the artist intends to understand might 
not be as easy for the viewer as it is to know what she intends to understand. It is 
considerably different to read and be aware of what the artist intends and to experience and 
understand what she intends. The inaccessibility of the use of the medium on the part of 
the viewer entails that the artist’s experience of understanding her intentions is different 
than that of the viewer. This lies in the fact that when painting the artist masters, practices, 
experiments with materials and techniques and experiences the medium in a dissimilar way 
to the viewer when she looks at the work. This kind of understanding painting on the part 
of the artist cannot be exactly passed on to the viewer. 
 
The issue of artist’s pleasure is also intriguing as it is hard to see how the intention to feel 
pleasure can plausibly be counted as part of the meaning of painting since it is not 
apparent. The absence of the pleasure of process which counts as meaning and intention 
for the artist, may not count so for the viewer as she has no means of discerning this 
through the representation of the work. It means that sometimes intentions – which cover a 
broad range of states as suggested throughout – are difficult for the viewer to access only 
through the representation of the painting. In retrospect, it appears that MAI reduces art 
making to a practice of transferring intentions and interpretation in this perspective 
eventually determines the ‘success’ of an artist in the narrow terms of the execution of her 
intentions.  
On a closing note, it is ambitious to assert the artist’s intentions from the representation of 
a painting since the empirical process weakens the objectivity of such an evaluation. An 
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objective process would demand its verification; however, in the case we discuss, this is 
impossible. In a sense, things would be more convenient if we had an a priori theory of 
interpretation which would not have to do with an empirical process and which would 
therefore assure absolute objectivity. In the case of painting, one cannot seclude the 
empirical aspect and wholly talk about it in a priori terms. Such an a priori theory would 
be connected with a priori knowledge in which the human aspect would not have access.  
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